A DEFENCE

OF

DR. SHERLOCK'S

NOTION

OF A

Trinity in Unity, &c.

[illegible]

LICENS'D.

ERRATA.

PAge 9. line 3. for *usual*, r. *unusual*, p. 21. l. 8. f. *any* r. *an*. l. 24. f. ἀπεράλλακτος r. ἀπαράλλακτος, p. 22. Marg. l. 9. r. ἑαυτὴν, p. 11. r. προηγούμενον.

A

DEFENCE

OF

Dr. *SHERLOCK's*

NOTION

OF A

Trinity in Unity,

In ANSWER to the

ANIMADVERSIONS upon his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed TRINITY.

With a POST-SCRIPT

Relating to the Calm Discourse of a Trinity in the GODHEAD.

In A Letter to a Friend.

LONDON,

Printed for W. Rogers, at the *Sun*, over-against St. *Dunstan's* Church in *Fleet-street*, MDCXCIV.

A DEFENCE OF Dr. *SHERLOCK*'s NOTION OF A Trinity in Unity, *&c.*

SIR,

I Had heard very often, and very much of the Animadverſions upon Dr. *Sherlock*'s *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; but I had alſo heard ſuch a Character of it, which both Friends and Foes agreed in, that I could not perſwade my ſelf to read it; For a Satyrical Wit is no diverſion to a Wiſe Man, except in a Play, and where it hurts no Body; and I could never think, that true Divine Wiſdom reſts on an ill-natured and perverſe Spirit. But your late Letter awakened me; for I could not but think that Book, whatever other Faults it had, muſt be worth reading, which you could

think worth anſwering, and ſeem ſo impatiently to expect, when the Dean, or ſome body for him, ſhould Anſwer it. As for the Dean, he has given Teſtimony to the World, that he has not been Idle all this while, but much better employed: And, to ſpeak my Mind freely, I don't ſee how he is obliged to Anſwer, unleſs you think a Man bound to Anſwer Ballads and Lampoons; for he is as little concerned in it as you are; that, had it not been for the Title Page, and ſome particular Expreſſions, which the Dean uſes, and the Animadverter furiouſly oppoſes, without underſtanding them, I could never have gueſſed againſt whom he had Writ. I had, a little before, read over the *Vindication*, and the Notions lay freſh and eaſie in my Mind, but as ſoon as I dipt into the *Animadverſions* they were all on a ſudden confounded, and put into diſorder. The Animadverter Diſputes earneſtly, ſubtilly, and triumphantly, opens his whole Armory of Metaphyſicks, and becauſe they are thin, airy Weapons, which do no great Execution, he points them with Wit and Satyr, to make them pierce the deeper.

It was the Saying of a very Witty Man, that *He who Writes lies down*, but it is to be ſuppoſed, he forgot it when he made the Experiment himſelf: But I muſt ſay this for the Animadverter, That he is as fair an Adverſary, upon this account as one would deſire; as he ſpares not thoſe who lie down before him, ſo he very civilly takes his turn, and lays himſelf as fairly open to Satyrical Wit, if the Dean, or any of his Friends, would condeſcend to exerciſe it upon him. When he ventures upon any thing like Wit, he always makes himſelf a Jeſt, and never ſo much inſults and triumphs over an Enemy, as where

where he is certainly himſelf in the Wrong: I will not entertain you with particular Remarks of this Nature; read over his Book again, if you have the Patience, and ſee if this be not true.

But, Sir, as well as I love you, I'm reſolved to humble you, for giving me the trouble of reading this Book, not by giving a particular Anſwer to the whole, which would be too unmerciful, but by convincing you, that it needed no Anſwer; and to let you ſee what a trifling Author you have either admired or feared, will prove ſome little Humiliation to you: But I ſhall do it in ſhort, to ſave my ſelf, as much as I can, the pains of Writing, and you of Reading, and therefore ſhall conſider only the main Points of Diſpute between the Animadverter and the Dean, concerning *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, *and Three eternal and infinite Minds.*

He rages furiouſly againſt the Dean, according to his Cuſtom, in a whole long Chapter, for diſcarding thoſe good old Terms of *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, &c. for his own new-invented Terms of *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*; that any one who reads it, would believe, That the Dean would not allow GOD to be a real Subſtantial Being, or to have any Nature or Eſſence; whereas he no where denies, That theſe are very good Words, and not only uſeful but neceſſary in ſome caſes, but yet very apt to confound us with Material and Senſible Images, when we go about to form a Notion and Idea of GOD. We know not the naked Subſtance or Eſſence of any Thing, not of Matter, much leſs of Spirit, and much leſs of an infinite and eternal Spirit; and therefore, as

we can form no other Idea of Matter, but by its ſenſible Qualities, ſo we can form no Idea of a Spirit, but by ſuch Attributes and Powers as are proper and eſſential to a Spirit; which is ſo far from being a Novelty, that it is to think and ſpeak with all the conſidering part of Mankind; but let this paſs, which the Dean is no more concerned in, were his Words and Sence truly and candidly repreſented, than the beſt Chriſtian Writers, both Ancient and Modern, as were eaſily ſhewn, did I not fear the Animadverter, ſhould he know it, would rail at them all for his ſake; for there is not a more Capital Crime, than to ſpeak any thing well of the Dean, or to ſay any thing that he ſays.

That which the Dean is more immediately concerned in, is the Idea he has endeavour'd to give us of a *Trinity in Unity*; and all that he poſitively aſſerts of it is, That it is a poſſible and intelligible Notion, and no other in Sence and Subſtance, than what the ancient Fathers made uſe of to repreſent this great Myſtery by, though expreſſed in other Terms.

To prepare you to judge equally in this Cauſe, you muſt remember, That the Subſtance of the Article is not concerned in it; here is no Diſpute about a *Trinity in Unity*: This the Dean aſſerts in as full and ample words as the *Athanaſian* Creed it ſelf, which ſome *Trinitarians* themſelves boggle at, but without reaſon as he thinks; for whoever will acknowledge Three Perſons in the Godhead, each of which diſtinctly conſidered is GOD, and has all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, and yet are all Three but one GOD, muſt, as he undertakes to prove, own the Terms and Explications of

that Creed. He has been careful to preserve a Real, not a meerly Nominal, distinction of Persons, and yet asserts the Unity of the Godhead in as high terms, as ever the Schools did, even a *Natural Numerical Unity*; and there is no reason to suspect he dissembles his Sence, for then he might have concealed it too, having no other obligation to engage in this Cause, but a Zeal for this *truly Ancient, Catholick, and Apostolick Faith.* Since then here is no Innovation made in the Faith, nor any alteration of the least term in it, what is the Fault? Truly no other than what the best Writers, both Ancient and Modern, have been equally guilty of, if it can be called a Fault.

Those who are acquainted with this Controversie, know, that the great Objection against the Catholick Faith of *the Trinity in Unity*, is not its contradiction to any plain and expres Principle of Reason, but the unconceiveables of it: It is certain, that Three should be One, and One Three, upon different accounts, is no contradiction, and then what Principle of Reason does a *Trinity in Unity* contradict? But we must grant, that we have no perfect Example of any such Union in Nature, and therefore cannot frame a compleat and positive Notion and Idea of such an Union: and this some Men miscall *Contradicting Reason*; but if every thing, which we have no positive Idea of, must be allowed to contradict Reason, we shall find Contradictions enow; and which is worse, must be forced to believe Contradictions; for we must confess a great many things to be true, which we have no Idea of, and cannot conceive how they should be.

But yet since the unconceivableness of this Union is the great difficulty, and great Objection (though in truth it is no Objection at all to any one, who considers, how unconceivable and incomprehensible the Divine Nature is) the Ancient Fathers endeavoured to help our conception and imagination of this by some sensible Images: Such as the Co-essentiality and Union of the Sun, its Light and Splendor, of a Fountain and its Streams, a Tree and its Branches, as the Dean has observed, and as every one knows, whoever looked into the Fathers.

But these are Material Images, and may serve for Allusions, and to render the Notion of a *Trinity in Unity* possible and credible; when we see some faint resemblances of it in the Material World; but they cannot help us to conceive, what kind of Union there is between the Divine Persons, the Union of Matter and Spirit differing as much as Matter and Spirit do, which have no likeness or resemblance to each other.

And therefore the Dean was certainly so far in the right, to seek for some Image and resemblance of this Mysterious Union in the Unity of a Spirit: For a Mind and Spirit is the truest Image of God, that is in Nature; for God is a Spirit, and therefore it is more likely to find some Image of the Unity of the Godhead in a Spirit, than in Matter, and yet we know nothing of a Spirit, but what we feel in our Selves, and can Philosophize no farther about it; for as Mr. *Lock* has truly observed, we can form no Idea but either from external Impressions, or internal Sensations; and therefore we can know no more of the Unity of a Spirit neither, than what we feel.

Now

Now whoever conſiders, how he knows himſelf to be a diſtinct and ſeparate Perſon from all other Men, will be able to reſolve it into nothing elſe but *Internal Senſation*, which the Dean, not improperly, calls *Self-conſciouſneſs*. The Unity of Matter conſiſts in the Unity of its parts, and we can ſee, how far its Unity extends, and where it ends; for its Unity extends, as far as the continuity of its parts extends, and ends, where that ends: But we know of no extenſion or parts in a Spirit, and therefore the very Nature of a Spirit conſiſting in internal and vital Senſation, the Unity of a Spirit conſiſts in the continuity (if I may ſo ſpeak) of its Senſation: So far as a Man feels himſelf, or is *Self-conſcious*, ſo far he is One entire Perſon; where this *Self-conſcious Senſation* ends, he becomes a diſtinct and ſeparate Perſon: For it is a Self-evident Propoſition, that in an intelligent *Self-conſcious* Being, Self can reach no farther than he feels himſelf. And I would deſire any thinking Man to tell me, how he knows himſelf to be a diſtinct and ſeparate Perſon from all other Men, but only by this, that he feels his own Thoughts, Volitions and Paſſions, Pains and Pleaſures, but feels nothing of all this in other Men.

I have been forced to explain this more at large, to help the Animadverter to ſome conception of it, who I find underſtood not one word of it, as will appear preſently. But to proceed. The Dean having thus obſerved, that the Unity of a ſingle Mind or Spirit conſiſts in ſuch a *Natural Self conſcious Senſation*, this led him on to that other Notion of a *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, which may be between Three diſtinct Spirits, and make them naturally One, as much as Three can be One. For if a Natural *Self-*

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conſcious Senſation makes a Spirit One with it ſelf, why ſhould not a natural *Mutual-conſcious Senſation* unite Three into One? For if natural Unity extends as far as *Conſcious Senſation*, then if *Conſcious Senſation* extends to Three, why ſhould not theſe Three be acknowledged to be naturally One? That as a natural *Self-conſciouſneſs* makes One natural Perſon, ſo natural *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* ſhould make a natural Trinity in Unity? For my part, I believe it is much eaſier to cry down this repreſentation as a Novelty, than to offer one word of Sence againſt it, or to make any other repreſentation of this Myſtery, with ſo fair and natural an appearance of Truth and Reaſon: For this *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* being *a natural Senſation*, is not a meer Moral, but a natural Union, not a Cabal of Gods, as a *Socinian* Writer Prophanely ſpeaks, but one ſupream natural Deity.

This indeed forced the Dean to ſpeak of the Three infinite and eternal Perſons in the Godhead, under the Character of *Three infinite and eternal Minds*, for this conſcious Senſation, whether *Self-conſciouſneſs* or *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, can belong only to Minds; and if every Perſon in the Trinity, conſidered as a diſtinct Perſon, be not a diſtinct, infinite, and eternal Mind, there is, I confeſs, an end of the Dean's Notion, but then, I doubt, there will be an end of a Trinity of Perſons alſo, and we ſhall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes and Poſtures, and Names, not in the Unity of the Godhead, but in the Unity of one Perſon who is the whole Deity and Godhead. But if every diſtinct Perſon in the Godhead conſidered as diſtinct, be an infinite and eternal Mind, as it muſt be, if every diſtinct

diſtinct Perſon be GOD, unleſs any thing elſe than an infinite Mind can be GOD, though it be an uſual way of ſpeaking to call them *Three eternal Minds*, yet there is no Hereſie in it, nor any intended by it, as will appear before we part.

Nor ought this to paſs for meer Fancy and Invention; for as the Dean has ſhewn the Phraſes and Expreſſions of Scripture, whereby the Union between Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt is deſcribed, do naturally repreſent this conſcious Union, and cannot well be underſtood without it; for that the Father ſhould be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, ſo as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended, with ſeveral like Expreſſions, is made very poſſible and intelligible by a mutual conſcious Senſation, but nothing elſe will afford us any Conception of it.

Now ſuppoſe, That after all theſe fair Appearances, a ſpiteful Wit could ſtart ſome difficulties in this Notion, (as it is not to be expected, that in a matter of ſo high a Nature, we ſhould have ſuch a perfect comprehenſion of it, as to leave no difficulties unexplained) ought not the Dean to have met with as fair Quarter, as other Writers have done in the ſame cauſe? Has he not given us as intelligible a repreſentation (and it is intended for no more) of a *Trinity in Unity*, *as the Sun, its Light and Splendor, a Tree and its Branches, a Fountain and its Streams, or a Mathematical Cube?* Are not all theſe Accounts, much more chargeable with Tritheiſm or Sabellianiſm? are not the Sun, its Light and Splendor, as much Three, but not ſo much One, as Three *Conſcious Minds?* Can there be a *Trinity in Unity*, un-

leſs there be a real and ſubſtantial Trinity? What work could our Animadverter have made with the Ancient Fathers, and ſome late Writers, had he thought fit to have treated them as he has done Dr. *Sherlock*? But it is in vain to expoſtulate, when the Man, not his Notions, is in Fault; and the only Comfort in ſuch caſes is, That Malice is as blind as Love, and ſo it has happened to the Animadverter, as I ſhall make appear.

But before I particularly anſwer the Animadverter's Arguments againſt *Self-conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, and *Three eternal Minds*, it will be neceſſary to Diſcourſe ſomething in general concerning a *Trinity in Unity*, and the words whereby to expreſs it. For a *Trinity in Unity* is ſuch a diſtinction, and ſuch an Union, as is peculiar to the Godhead; and though there are ſome faint reſemblances of it in Nature, yet Nature has nothing like it, and then it is impoſſible we ſhould have any words that can adæquately expreſs it. It may help to allay the heat and virulence of Diſputation among thoſe who heartily believe a *Trinity in Unity*, (as I hope the Animadverter does) to diſcourſe this matter plainly and briefly.

The Scriptures, both of the Old and New Teſtament, every where aſſure us, That there is but One GOD; and not to take notice now of the more obſcure intimations of a Trinity in the Old Teſtament, Chriſt in his Goſpel, and his Apoſtles after him, have aſcribed the Name and Character and incommunicable Attributes of GOD to *Three*, *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*; we are by the Command of Chriſt Baptized *in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt*, and we are bleſſed

bleſſed in their Name, *The Grace of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and the Love of God, and the Communion of the Holy Ghoſt, be with you all Amen.* Chriſt declares himſelf to be the Son of GOD, and to be One with his Father; and St. *John* tells us, That he is that *Word, which was in the beginning, and was with God, and was God.* That *by him all things were made, and without him was not any thing made, that was made.* And the like Divine Attributes are aſcribed to the Holy Spirit; and therefore, though there be One GOD, we muſt acknowledge, if we believe the Goſpel, that there are Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt in the Unity of the Godhead. This is the true ſimplicity of the Chriſtian Faith, to believe Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt to be One GOD; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghoſt; that the Son is not the Father, nor the Holy Ghoſt; that the Holy Ghoſt is not the Father nor the Son; but that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghoſt God; and all Three but One God.

Now one would have thought, that the Authority of Chriſt and his Apoſtles, had been a ſufficient Foundation for this Faith, without any farther enquiries; but the Devil very well knew, That the whole Oeconomy of our Salvation by Chriſt, and conſequently the whole Chriſtian Religion, depended on this Faith; and that the curioſity of Mankind, the weakneſs of their Underſtandings, and their vain preſumption in meaſuring GOD himſelf by their narrow Conceits, might eaſily be managed to unſettle theſe Foundations; and therefore here he made ſome of his earlieſt Attempts.

The ancient Chriſtians, before this was made a matter of Diſpute, contented themſelves with profeſſing their Faith, in One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; but when Hereſies in ſeveral Ages of the Church were broached, and ſome, to ſecure the Unity of the Godhead, made Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt no more than Three different Names, belonging to Three different Appearances and Manifeſtations of the ſame One God; others (if they were not miſunderſtood or miſrepreſented) did not only diſtinguiſh, but ſeparate Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and made Three abſolute independent Gods of them, and others denied the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, which preſerved the Unity of the Godhead, by reducing the only begotten Son, and the Holy Spirit of God into the rank of Creatures: This forced the Orthodox Fathers into a Diſpute, where they wanted Words adæquately to expreſs their Sence.

The Doctrine, which they conſtantly affirmed and defended againſt Hereticks of all ſorts, was this; That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, were Three, as really diſtinct from one another, as Three humane Perſons are, and that each of them is true and perfect God, and has all Divine Perfections in himſelf, and yet that all Three are eſſentially One, and the ſame eternal and infinite God. But when they came to ſay, what theſe Three are, and how they are One, by what Name to call this wonderful diſtinction and Unity, here Words failed them, as of neceſſity they muſt, becauſe there is no ſuch Diſtinction and Unity in Nature, and therefore no Name for it. For the Names of diſtinction in ordinary uſe do not only diſtinguiſh, but divide and ſeparate

ſeparate their Subjects, and the Names of Unity ſignifie ſingularity alſo, which admits no number. And this has occaſioned moſt of our cavilling Diſputes, and raiſed all the noiſe and clamour about Abſurdities and Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity; and there is no help for this, if Men will ask ſuch Queſtions, as the proper and natural ſignification of Words cannot reach the Myſtery of, and not allow ſuch a Theological uſe of Words, as a little alters their natural Signification, to accommodate them to repreſent ſome divine and ſupernatural Myſteries.

Thus for Example: *A Perſon* ſignifies a reaſonable underſtanding Being, which actually ſubſiſts, and is diſtinguiſhed from all other Beings of the ſame kind; but then it ſignifies more than this, not only a diſtinct, but a ſeparate Subſiſtence; for ſo all created Perſons are, not only diſtinct, but ſeparate Beings, who have a compleat, abſolute, independant Subſiſtence of their own. But when we uſe this Word *Perſon* in a Theological Senſe, as applied to Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt in the ever-bleſſed Trinity, we only uſe it in the ſenſe of diſtinction, not of ſeparation, to ſignifie, that each of theſe Holy Three has all the Perfections of infinite Mind and Underſtanding, diſtinctly, as other Perſons have, but not ſeparately, as created Perſons have. And ſince there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead thus really diſtinguiſhed from each other without a ſeparation, I know no reaſon why we may not uſe this Word Perſon in this limited Sence, to ſignifie Three, who are as really diſtinct from each other, but not ſeparated, as other Perſons are: For when it is known in what ſence we uſe the Word, when applied to the Trinity, it is trifling

to

to diſpute againſt Three Perſons in the Godhead, from the ſignification of the Word Perſon, when applied to Creatures; and yet this is the Sum total of all the Socinian Arguments againſt *Three Perſons, and One God*, and of all the Contradictions they pretend to find in it. Three Divine Perſons, they ſay, muſt be Three abſolute, compleat, independent Gods, becauſe Three Humane Perſons are Three compleat, abſolute Men, who ſubſiſt independently on each other; and therefore it is as manifeſt a Contradiction, That Three Divine Perſons ſhould be but One God, as it is, that Three Humane Perſons ſhould be but One Man; which ſignifies nothing, if we do not uſe the Word *Perſon* in the ſame Senſe (and all the World knows we do not) when applied to the Holy Trinity, as when applied to Men: For it is meer trifling to diſpute againſt us from ſuch a Senſe of the Word, as we reject, and declare to all Men that we do reject. The moſt that can be made of this is, that we uſe an improper Word, and ought not to call Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt Three Perſons, becauſe that is to make Three Gods of them, as *Peter*, *James*, and *John* are Three Men: But when the importunity of Hereticks forces us to find Names for that, which nothing in created Nature can anſwer, if they will not give us leave, we muſt take leave to uſe the propereſt Names we can find, though not every way proper; and ſuch the Name of *Perſon* is, when applied to the *Perſons of the Trinity*: For all that this Word *Perſon* ſignifies, except *a ſeparate Subſiſtence*, belongs to the Perſons of the Holy Trinity. An intelligent Nature, and all perſonal Acts of Underſtanding, Volition, *&c.* do as diſtinctly belong to each Perſon, as to any Humane Perſons; and it is this makes a Perſon, not a ſeparate

ſeparate Subſiſtence, which belongs only to finite and created, not to infinite and eternal Perſons: And therefore the Word Perſon is properly enough applied to the Three Divine Perſons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, becauſe all that is eſſential to the Notion of a Perſon, belongs to each of them, though they do not ſubſiſt ſeparately, as Humane Perſons do.

But yet Men are very apt to judge of the Divine Perſons, by what they ſee in Humane Perſons, and to fancy theſe Three Perſons in the Deity to be like Three Men, who have the ſame Humane Nature, but ſubſiſt and act ſeparately, and are *One* only by a moral Conſent and Unity: And therefore to prevent this Imagination, which betrays Men to down right Tritheiſm, others, without rejecting the Name Perſon, have thought fit more expreſly to ſignifie what kind of Perſons they are, by calling them *Three Subſiſtences*; that is, Three who have all the Perfections of the Godhead, and do really and diſtinctly ſubſiſt; for elſe they could not be *Three Subſiſtences*, but yet do not ſubſiſt as *ſeparate Perſons*, but are eſſentially One God: For *Subſiſtence* does not neceſſarily infer Separation, for Three may diſtinctly ſubſiſt, though eſſentially and inſeparably united. And this is the difference between *Perſon* and *Subſiſtence*, that according to the moſt uſual acceptation of the Word Perſon, which it is hard to correct, (for that Idea which in common uſe belongs to a Word, is apt to ſtick cloſe to it,) *Three Perſons*, ſignifie Three who ſubſiſt apart, and as *ſeparately* as Three Men do: But *Three Subſiſtences* are Three Perſons who ſubſiſt diſtinctly without Separation: For *Subſiſtence* neceſſarily ſignifies a diſtinct and real, but not a ſeparate Subſiſtence; for

if

if Three really ſubſiſt without a Separation, they are *Three real Subſiſtences*; and therefore it is in vain for the Socinians to diſpute againſt Three Perſons, that they muſt be Three ſeparate Perſons, unleſs they can prove that they cannot really ſubſiſt without a Separation, which none of them ever yet undertook; and yet all their Talk of Contradictions and Three Gods, vaniſhes without it.

What I have ſaid of the Word *Perſon*, is with equal reaſon applicable to the Word *Mind*. The Animadverter objects againſt the Dean, That *a Mind or Spirit is an abſolute Being, Nature, or Subſtance*; and I grant it is ſo in the common uſe of the Word, as applied to created Minds and Spirits; but ſo is *Perſon* alſo, as much as *Mind*; and if we allow of a Theological uſe of the Word *Perſon*, why not of *Mind* too? to ſignifie an *intelligent Subſiſtence*, which is a *Mind* too, but not *a ſeparate Mind*, and therefore not ſuch an *abſolute Being, Nature, and Subſtance*, as a created Mind is. And when the Dean ſpeaks of *Three diſtinct infinite Minds, which are eſſentially and inſeparably One*, he could mean nothing more than three diſtinct intelligent, but not ſeparate Subſiſtences: And he needs ask no other Pardon, but for the uſe of a Word, which the Schools have not conſecrated.

But there is greater want of Words to expreſs the Unity and Oneneſs of the Divine Nature and Eſſence, than the diſtinction of Perſons. The *Nicene* Fathers in their Controverſie with *Arius*, of which, (if there be occaſion more hereafter,) who denied the Divinity of Chriſt, and made him no more than a Creature, though as perfect, and as like to God as a Creature could be, uſed the Word *Homoouſion*, which

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was not first invented by them to serve that turn, but was used either in Words or Sence by the *Anti-Nicene* Fathers, as the learned Dr. *Bull* has proved.

But what is this *Homoousion*, or *Sameness of Nature*? This is the difficulty; for there is not any one Word to explain it by, which adequately answers the full Notion of the Divine Unity; and that is no great wonder, because there is no perfect Example in Nature of any such Unity.

They very often explain this by Examples of a Specifick Unity: That the Father and Son have the same Nature, as *Abraham* and *Isaac* have; and therefore they call Men, who have the same Specifick Nature, Ὁμοούσιοι, and so they do the Sun, its Light, and Splendor, the Tree and its Branches, *&c.* And this is in part a true representation of the *Homoousiotes*, or Sameness of Nature in the Persons of the Holy Trinity; for if there be not that which perfectly Answers, though it much out-does also a specifick Sameness and Unity, their Nature cannot be the same, and accordingly they prove against the *Arians*, that Christ cannot be the Son of God, if he be not *Homoousios* to his Father, because every Father begets a Son in his own Nature.

But yet we must not say, nor did they intend it so, That the Unity of Nature between Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, is a meer specifick Sameness. For we must not make the Divine Nature a Species, which is common to more Individuals; for then the Unity of the Divine Nature is no more than a Logical Notion, which is the only Unity of a Specifick Nature; whereas God is essentially and numerically one. The Three Divine Persons are not individuals of the same Nature; for then they must

have Three individual ſubſiſting Divine Natures, which would as much make Three Gods, as Three individual ſubſiſting Humane Natures make Three Men: The Divine Nature would then be communicated by Multiplication, as Humane Nature is, which muſt multiply Gods as well as Men.

Is this Sameneſs of Nature then one ſingle or ſingular Nature, which has but one ſingle Subſiſtence? This the Fathers utterly deny, as being the Hereſie of *Sabellius*, and leaving no other Trinity of Perſons in the Godhead, but a Trinity of Names. The Divine Nature is *One Individual* Nature (as you ſhall hear preſently) but not *One Single* Nature; for one Single Nature can be but One Perſon, whether in God or Man.

I ſhall not diſpute this at large now; I may find a properer place for it, but I ſhall only obſerve at preſent, That if there be but One only ſingle Nature in God, the whole Trinity muſt be Incarnate in the Incarnation of Chriſt, as *Sabellius* aſſerted: For the Divine Nature was Incarnate in Chriſt, he *was perfect God, and perfect Man*, and if there was but one ſingle ſubſiſting Nature in all Three Perſons, this one ſingle Divine Nature was Incarnate; and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghoſt, who are this one ſingle Divine Nature, as well as the Son, muſt be as much Incarnate as the Son was; for though it were poſſible to conceive Three Divine Perſons in One ſingle Divine Nature, yet it is abſolutely impoſſible, that this One ſingle Nature ſhould be incarnate, and not the Divine Nature of all the Three Perſons be incarnate, when it is but One ſingle Nature in all: And it is abſurd to ſay, that the One Divine Nature of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt

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is incarnate, and yet none but the Son incarnate. This is what *Victorinus Afer* teaches: *Non oportet dicere, nec fas est dicere, unam esse Substantiam, tres esse Personas; si enim ista ipsa Substantia & egit omnia, & passa est, patripassiani & nos; absit.* Bibl. Patr. Tom. 4. *We ought not*, says he, *to say, nor is it lawful to say, that there is but One Substance*, (that is, One single subsisting Nature,) *and Three Persons; for if this same Substance did and suffered all, we also must be* Patripassians; *which God forbid*; That is, we must say, That the Father suffered as well as the Son, as *Sabellius* taught. It is such Animadversions, and such unintelligible Notions, which make the Christian Faith ridiculed by Atheists and Hereticks.

But the great difficulty is, how to conceive One *Individual* Nature, which is *numerically* One, but is not One *single* Nature: And yet thus it must be, if there be a Trinity in Unity, Three real Hypostases and Subsistences in One Divine Nature; which the Counterfeit *Areopagite*, but an ancient and learned Writer, calls Μονάδα τρισυπόστατον, a *Monad* or *Unite*, which thrice subsists, or has Three Subsistences; whereas it is demonstrable, That One single Nature can subsist but once, or have but One Subsistence: And therefore the ancient Fathers owned, that Father and Son is *alius & alius*, and that God is *solus*, but *non solitarius*.

That I may be the better understood, and give you some imperfect Conception of this great and venerable Mystery, let us contemplate this individual Identity and Sameness of Nature, in a Man and his Image.

A Man sees his own Image in a Glass, the exact Proportion of his Body, all the Lines and Features in his Face, all his own Motions, and Postures, whe-

ther he ſmiles or cries, ſits or ſtands. Now ſuppoſe this were a real, living Image, as exactly himſelf, both in Body and Mind, as the Image in the Glaſs repreſents his external Shape and Features: That this living Image was coeval with himſelf, and did ſubſiſt as neceſſarily as he did, and yet as much depend upon him, as the Image in the Glaſs does on his Face and Preſence: That this Living Image did underſtand and will in the ſame Act with himſelf, and repeat all his Motions and Paſſions, and Senſations, as his Face in the Glaſs does: That this living Image knew himſelf to be but an Image, diſtinct from the Original, but the ſame with him; and that the Man whoſe Image it is, knew himſelf to be diſtinct from his Image, but yet the ſame; and that the Man and his living Image felt each other, and all that is in each other, in themſelves.

Now I deſire to know by what Name you would call ſuch a living Image? You cannot deny him to be a Man, becauſe he has Humane Nature in himſelf, and diſtinctly in himſelf, as compleatly and perfectly as the Man has, whoſe Image he is, or elſe he were not a compleat and perfect Image: And yet you cannot ſay that he is a diſtinct Man, or another Man, a Second Man, for he is but an Image, and the very ſame with the Original, and therefore they are both but One Man; naturally One, not as Two other Men are, who may be morally One, by a Conſent and Agreement of Underſtanding and Will, but by an individual Unity and Sameneſs of Nature and Will: And yet you muſt confeſs them to be Two, though not Two Men, not Two Humane Natures; for the Man is not his Image, nor the Image the Man, whoſe Image he is: But if you will call the Man a Perſon,

Perſon, as certainly every Man is a Perſon, then his Image, which is the ſame with himſelf, muſt be a Perſon too, and not the ſame Perſon: So that here are Two diſtinct Perſons ſubſiſting in One Individual Nature, not multiplied, but repeated in its Image. There is indeed no ſuch living Image as this in created Nature; but yet this is the true Nature of any Image, and gives us an intelligible Conception of the Unity of Nature in a plurality of Perſons.

And this is the plain account of the eſſential Unity between God the Father, and God the Son. Chriſt is expreſly called εἰκὼν Θεοῦ, the Image of God, 2 *Cor.* 4. 4. and *Col.* 1. 15. and ſaid to be ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, in the Form of God, *Phil.* 2. 6. and to be the brightneſs of his Glory, καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, the expreſs Character and Image of his Perſon. And becauſe there are ſeveral ſorts of Images, the ancient Fathers declare what kind of Image Chriſt is of God the Father; That he is not a dead Picture, nor a meer Reflection in a Glaſs, but is a living Image of the living God. Ζῶντος καὶ ζῶσα, as *Gregory Nazianzen* ſpeaks, *Deum viventis Dei vivam imaginem*, as St. *Hilary* tells us, that Chriſt is God, the living Image of the living God. Εἰκὼν ζῶσα, φυσικὴ, καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος τοῦ ὁρατοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ υἱὸς, ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρων τὸν πατέρα, κατὰ πάντα ἴσον τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ταυτότητα, μόνῳ δὲ διαφέρων τῷ αἰτίατῷ, as *Damaſcen* ſpeaks, That the Son is the living, natural, invariable Image of the inviſible God; having the whole Father in himſelf, and being upon all accounts identically the ſame with him, excepting the Principle and Cauſe of Being; that is, that He is begotten eternally of the Father, but the Father is unbegotten.

Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. Hil. *l.* 11. de Trinit.

Damaſc. l. 1. de imaginibus.

But then, though he be the Son, and the begotten Image of the Father, he is not his Image meerly,

meerly as other Sons are the Images of their Fathers, who, though they partake of the same specifick Nature, may be very unlike them, and are not the same; but as *Gregory Nazianzen* tells us in the place above-cited, Christ is the living Image of the living Father, καὶ πλέον ἔχουσα τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον, ἢ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὁ Σὴθ, καὶ τοῦ γεννῶντος τὸ γεννώμενον· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁπλῶν φύσις, μὴ τῷ μὲν ἐοικέναι, τῷ δὲ ἀπεοικέναι, ἀλλ' ὅλον ὅλου τύπον εἶναι, καὶ ταυτὸν μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀφομοίωμα: *But a more invariable Image than* Seth *is of* Adam, *or any Child of his Father; for the Nature of such simple and unmixt things, as an Image is, is not to be partly like, and partly unlike, (as Children are to their Parents,) but that the whole represents the whole, as the impression does the Seal, and rather to be the same, than to be like.*

But St. *Gregory Nyssen* gives us the most exact Description of Christ's being * *the living Image of his Father, of his Will, and of his Goodness, which,* he says, *is just as if a Man saw himself in a Glass; for the Image in the Glass does in every thing conform it self to its Prototype; the Face which looks in the Glass, being the Cause of the Face which is seen there; and therefore the Image in the Glass neither moves, nor inclines it self of its own accord, but as its Prototype moves or inclines, but always moves with it. Thus we say, the Lord Christ, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and instantly affected together with his Father. Does the Father will any thing? the Son also, who*

* Διότι οὐδὲ ἔστι διαφορὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐν θελήματι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τῆς ἀγαθότητος κάλλος, καὶ ἢ εἰκὼν ἔστι τῆς ἀγαθότητος, καὶ ὥσπερ εἰ τὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐν κατόπτρῳ βλέπει.—— Κατὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον καὶ ἢ εἰκὼν μορφωθήσεται, ὡς αἰτίαν τῆς ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ μορφῆς εἶναι τὴν ἐνορῶσαν μορφήν· καὶ μήτε κινεῖσθαι, μήτε διακλίνεσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα, μὴ τῆς ἀρχετύπου τῆς ὀπτικλίσεως, ἢ τῆς κινήσεως ἄρξαντος· εἰ δὲ κινηθείη τὸ προηγούμενον, συγκινεῖσθαι πάντως καὶ τὸ ἐν κατόπτρῳ δεικνύμενον· οὕτω φαμὲν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, τὸν κύριον, πρὸς πᾶσαν θελήματος κίνησιν ἀμέσως καὶ καὶ ἀδιαστάτως συνδιατίθεσθαι τῷ Πατρὶ ἠθέλησα τι ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ ὁ ἐν Πατρὶ ὢν υἱὸς εἶδε τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Πατρὸς; μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐγένετο θέλημα. Greg. Nyss. contra Eunom. Orat. 12. p. 345.

who is in the Father, knows the Father's Will, or rather, *is the Father's Will*. Whether this be not the Dean's *mutual Conſciouſneſs*, which muſt of neceſſity be between a living Image and its Prototype, or that whereof it is the Image, and is the moſt natural and inſeparable Union of all, let any Man judge.

It were eaſie to fill the Margin with ſuch Quotations as theſe, as you who are converſant in the Fathers, very well know; but I ſhall only farther obſerve at preſent, that the Fathers made uſe of this Notion of the Son's being the living Image of God his Father, both in their Diſputes againſt the *Arians* and *Sabellians*.

They proved from hence againſt the *Arians*, that the Son was ὁμοούσιος, of the ſame Nature with his Father, which is a plain and neceſſary Conſequence, and needs no proof; for if the Father and the Son be the ſame, as a Prototype and his Image, there can be no Diverſity of Nature between them. Thus St. *Hilary*, St. *Baſil*, St. *Cyril*, St. *Ambroſe*, St. *Athanaſius*, *Greg. Nyſſen*, St. *Auſtin*, and all the Fathers who were concerned in the *Arian* Controverſie, reaſon at large.

And thus they proved againſt the *Sabellians*, That God was not One ſingle Perſon, diſtinguiſhed only by Three Names; becauſe the Son is the living ſubſiſting Image of the Father, and the Image and the Prototype cannot be the ſame, but muſt be Two; no Man is his own Image, nor is an Image the Image of it ſelf. This is ſo ſelf-evident, and ſo frequently occurs in the ancient Writers, that I ſhall not detain you with particular Quotations at preſent.

This real diſtinction of Three in the ſame individual numerical Nature, the Ancients expreſſed by the

the τρόπον ὑπάρξεως: That the ſame One individual Nature ſubſiſts thrice, in Three real Subſiſtences, not by multiplying, but only by repeating it ſelf. As a Man and his living Image would be Two real Subſiſtences, but not Two Men, nor Two Humane Natures, but the ſame Man and the ſame Nature ſubſiſting twice in Two different manners, not like Two Men, but as the Prototype and the Image, which are really and diſtinctly Two, and yet but One Man. Thus Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are really Three, but have the ſame individual Nature, and are the ſame One God, and differ only in their manner of ſubſiſting; That the ſame Divine Nature ſubſiſts originally in the Father, and ſubſiſts again in the Son, as in a living Image of the Father, and ſubſiſts a third time in the Holy Ghoſt by an eternal Proceſſion from Father and Son, in eternal, living ſubſtantial Love.

In this Sence the Ancients underſtood the Word *Subſiſtence*, not in the Abſtract, as ſome modern School-men do, and as the Animadverter ſeems to do, if I underſtand him, or he underſtands himſelf; but in the Concrete, for that which does really and actually ſubſiſt; which does *exſtare*, and is called by them *Extantia* and ὕπαρξις: And this is very intelligible, that there are Three real Subſiſtences, or Three that really ſubſiſt in the numerical and individual Unity of the Divine Nature. But to talk of Three Subſiſtences in the abſtract without Three that ſubſiſt, or of One ſingle Nature, which has Three Subſiſtences, when it is impoſſible, that in Singularity there can be more than One Subſiſtence, is too fine and metaphyſical for me, and I envy no Man that can underſtand it. Ὑπόστασις among the *Greeks* is, *res ſubſiſtens & ſubſtantiva*, as *Petavius* proves; a ſubſiſting

Petav. de Trin. p. 342. & alibi.

and

and ſubſtantial thing: And St. *Ambroſe* abhors the thoughts, that the Son ſhould not be a Subſtantial Son, who gives Subſtance to other things; *Non eſſe filium inſubſtantivum, qui aliis dedit habere ſubſtantiam:* And *Facundus* tells us, that theſe Words, *Perſon*, and *Subſiſtence*, were uſed by the Fathers in oppoſition to the *Sabellian* Hereſie; and therefore muſt ſignifie Three that did really and ſubſtantially ſubſiſt; as St. *Hilary* teaches, *Non unum eſſe ſubſiſtentem, ſed unam ſubſtantiam non differentem; That there is not One who ſubſiſts, but One Subſtance without any diverſity*; that is, in three different Subſiſtencies.

Ambr. l. 3. de fide, c. 7.

Facundus pro defenſione trium capit, c. 1. p. 19.

Hil. l. de Synod.

There could not have been more proper Words thought on to repreſent a Trinity in Unity, than Three Subſiſtencies in One individual Nature, which differ in nothing from each other, but in their different manner of Subſiſtence. For it is certain here are Three different kinds of Subſiſtence, which are not to be found in any One thing in the World beſides. Nothing elſe has any more than one real Subſiſtence; for every Being in Nature beſides is ſingular, or has but One ſingle Subſiſtence. Every Man and Angel is a ſingle particular Creature, ſubſiſts ſingly and ſeparately by it ſelf, and is ſingly One; but if there be a Trinity in Unity, the ſame Divine Nature muſt ſubſiſt wholly, entirely, and ſubſtantially in Three, but in a different manner to make them Three. And it is as certain, that the Father and the Son, though they have the very ſame Nature, yet ſubſiſt in a very different manner, the Father as Original Mind, the Son as the perfect, living, ſubſtantial Image of the Father, which is as different as the Subſiſtence of the Prototype and the Image; and every one will grant, that a Man and his Image, though it

were a living ſubſtantial Image, have a very different Subſiſtence; for the Image has its whole Subſiſtence in dependance on its Prototype; the Man ſubſiſts by himſelf, and gives Subſiſtence to his Image; and the ſame we muſt conceive of the Subſiſtence of the Holy Spirit, though we have not ſo apt a Similitude to repreſent it by.

And if we muſt call the Three in the Holy Trinity, by any other Name than Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, Three Subſiſtences is liable to the leaſt Cavil, and does moſt properly expreſs their general Character; for they are but One Divinity, or One Divine Nature ſubſiſting wholly and entirely Three times, without multiplication, as a Man is not multiplied but repeated in his Image. All other Names in their proper and uſual Sence, ſignifie an abſolute, compleat, independent Being, ſuch as *Nature*, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *God*: And therefore though each Divine Perſon have a natural, eſſential, ſubſtantial Subſiſtence, and be true and real God; yet we muſt not ſay, that there are Three Divine Natures, Eſſences, Subſtances, or Three Gods; becauſe though the whole Divine Nature, Eſſence, ſubſiſts in Three, yet it is but one and the ſame in all; and tho' God be the moſt abſolute, compleat, independant Being, and the Son be God, and the Holy Ghoſt God, yet neither the Son, nor the Holy Ghoſt can be ſaid to be an abſolute, compleat, independant God, becauſe Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are but One God; neither of which ſubſiſt abſolutely, compleatly, independently; that is, without each other; which is all that is meant by an abſolute, compleat, independent Subſiſtence, that they can ſubſiſt apart without each other; but the Father can no more ſubſiſt without the Son, than the Son without the Father;

Father; nor the Holy Spirit without Father and Son; nor Father and Son without the Holy Spirit; as a natural and neceſſary Image cannot ſubſiſt without its Prototype, nor the Prototype without its Image, which is eſſential to it; ſo that they are but One abſolute, compleat, independent Deity, though the Three Divine Subſiſtences in the Godhead ſubſiſt in a mutual reſpect, and a relative dependance on each other.

And this, I ſuppoſe, is what the Schools mean, when they call the Three Divine Perſons, Three Relations, or Three Relatives; for there muſt be Three real ſubſiſting Relatives, if there be Three Relations; for One Subſiſtence cannot be the Subject of Three Relations, no more than one and the ſame Man can be related to himſelf as Father and Son. But then the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit are ſuch Relations, as there is no Example of in created Nature; for their Relation to each other is not a meer external Reſpect and Denomination, ſuch as abſolute independant Beings have to each other, but their very Nature and Subſiſtence, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, is relative. Though the Father be eternal original Mind, yet it is eſſential to this eternal Mind to beget his own living ſubſtantial Image; and therefore this eternal Mind is naturally and eſſentially related to his Image: And I need not tell you, that the very Nature and Subſiſtence of an Image is wholly relative; a natural and eſſential Image ſubſiſts as neceſſarily as the Prototype, but its Nature is wholly relative. Thus Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt have the ſame common Nature; not common as a generical or ſpecifick Nature, which is only a logical Notion, but as One individual Nature, really and

actually ſubſiſting in each, without any other difference than their different manner of Subſiſtence, and their different Relations, as a Man and his living Image, have the ſame individual Nature common to both, and differ only in their manner of Subſiſtence and Relations; that is, as the Prototype and its living Image differ. And this I think gives us an intelligible account of a Trinity in Unity in the moſt Orthodox Language of Fathers and Schools.

This ſhews us, that the Son, and Holy Spirit, are not Divine Emanations from the Father, as is repreſented in the *Platonick Triad*: For though the eternal Generation and Proceſſion be ſuch Myſteries, as we cannot comprehend, nor frame any Idea or Conception of, yet we know that an Image is not an Emanation, but a Reflexion; and therefore is wholly and entirely the ſame with the Prototype, which no Emanation can be; for the whole cannot be an Emanation: An Emanation indeed is of the ſame Subſtance, and is ſpecifically the ſame; and in this Sence *Homoouſios*; but it multiplies Natures and Subſtances, and is not individually and identically the ſame as the Prototype and its Image; and therefore the Fathers declare, That the eternal Generation of the Son is not by Abſciſſion and Paſſion, but think the apteſt Repreſentation of it in Nature, (though that is very different) is by Splendor and Brightneſs, or ἔκλαμψις, the *out-ſhining* of the Deity; and when they call the Holy Spirit προβολὴ, it is not in the Sence of Emanation, but of the myſterious *Proceſſion.*

This alſo ſhews us, That this Holy Trinity is not Three Divine Attributes, ſuch as Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs; for they are all Three the very ſame with each other, the ſame Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power,

Power, and therefore not Three Parts or Attributes of the ſame Deity, but each is the whole, as a Prototype, and its living Image is.

And this ſhews, That though the Son be true and perfect God, as the Father is, yet the Son can never be a Father, becauſe his Nature and Subſiſtence as a Son is wholly relative; and a Son, whoſe Nature and Subſiſtence is relative, is neceſſarily and eſſentially a Son, but can never be a Father, no more than the Image can beget its Prototype.

And this gives a plain Account, why our Saviour calls God, not only *his Father*, but *his God*, and *the only true God*, and acknowledges, That *he receives all from his Father*, and, That *his Father is greater than he is*; though he have the very ſame Nature, and with reſpect to his Nature is equal in Power and Glory; for this is the true difference between the Prototype and the Image, though their Nature be the ſame. Had a Man a living ſubſtantial Image, perfectly the ſame with himſelf, as God has, the Image muſt thus ſpeak of his Prototype, as the Son of God ſpeaks of his Father. He muſt acknowledge that the Prototype is *his Man*, for he is only the Image of the Man; and were there only One Man in the World, as there is but One God, he muſt acknowledge the Prototype to be the *only true Man*; for though the living Image would be a true Man alſo, yet he is not originally Man, but *Man of Man*, a Man only by Relation and Participation with its Prototype; and therefore the Prototype is greater than its Image, and the Image receives all from the Prototype, depends on it, and ſubſiſts and lives in and by it, as the Son acknowledges, That *he lives by the Father*, *John* 6.57. This is manifeſtly the Language of Scripture and Fathers

thers concerning the Son of God, his living and ſubſtantial Image; and I hope you ſee, That this is proper and peculiar only to a living ſubſiſting Image; and can be applied to nothing elſe, but is the only proper way that we can ſpeak of ſuch an Image, or that ſuch an Image can ſpeak of it ſelf; this is intelligible, though the Myſtery of this eternal living Image is inconceivable.

This I ſuppoſe is what the Dean meant; when he ſaid, That *Some tolerable Account might be given of the Terms and Diſtinctions of the Schools*; and I believe you begin to ſee, That this repreſentation I have now made of this Venerable Myſtery, will contribute very much to the better Underſtanding both of the Fathers and of the Schools, as may appear more hereafter; but at preſent I ſhall only ſhew you, That this is the true repreſentation of the Dean's Notion of a *Trinity in Unity*.

The Dean does profeſſedly Teach, That the Three Perſons or Subſiſtences in the ever bleſſed Trinity, are Three real Subſtantial Subſiſtences, each of which has entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature; Divine Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs; and therefore each of them is eternal, infinite Mind, as diſtinct from each other, as any other Three Perſons; and this I believe he will no more Recant, than he will renounce a Trinity; for all the Wit of Man can't find a Medium between a Subſtantial Trinity, and a Trinity of Names, or a Trinity of meer Modes, Reſpects, and Relations in the ſame ſingle Eſſence, which is no Trinity at all. And if the Son, as you heard, be the living Image of his Father's Nature, Eſſence and Perfections, the Divine Nature, though it be not multiplied, yet

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is repeated in the Son, and does as really and distinctly subsist in the Son, as it does in the Father; as had a Man a living Image, his Image would be as substantially and really Man, as the Prototype is, or as the Man himself, whose Image it is, though the Man and his Image, which are really and substantially Two, are not Two Men, but One Man. And thus the Dean might very safely say, That there are Three in the Godhead, each of which is a distinct, infinite, eternal Mind; and though Custom has not made the form of Expression Orthodox, yet there is no Heretical Sence in it, to call them Three infinite and eternal Minds, with respect to their Nature and real Subsistence, to distinguish them from meer Names, and Logical Notions, if at the same time it be declared, That they are individually and numerically One: As it would be no Mortal Crime against Logick and common Sence to say, That a Man and his Living Image are Two distinct Men, with respect to the real and actual Subsistence of Humane Nature distinctly in each of them, though the Image is not another Man, but the same with its Prototype.

This is the distinction which the Dean makes between the Three Divine Persons, which yet could not be Three, were they not Three Self-conscious Subsistencies; for there cannot be Three in a knowing and intelligent Nature, without knowing themselves and their distinction from each other; That the Father knows himself to be the Father, and not the Son, and the Son knows himself to be the Son, and not the Father. This every Man feels in himself to be a real and natural distinction of one Person from another, and the Scripture is express in it, that

that Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are thus diſtinguiſhed; and this the Dean thought, and as far as I can yet ſee, with great Reaſon, to be the moſt eaſie and ſenſible repreſentation of a real and natural Trinity.

As for the Unity of theſe three Divine Perſons, the Dean expreſly Teaches, That they are eſſentially and numerically One. And as the moſt ſenſible Repreſentation of this, he places their Unity in *Mutual conſciouſneſs*, that they have as *Conſcious a Senſation* of each other in themſelves as they have of themſelves: And he is certainly ſo far in the right, that this is eſſential to their Unity; That Three intelligent Subſiſtences cannot be One without this *Mutual conſciouſneſs*, and that this *Mutual conſciouſneſs* cannot be in Three, which are not eſſentially and numerically One. The Scripture plainly enough Teaches this very Unity between Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, as he has proved at large; and if this either be, or prove, or neceſſarily ſuppoſes an eſſential Unity, as inſeparable from it, and eſſential to it, here is an intelligible Notion of a natural Trinity in Unity, without any Contradiction, Abſurdity, or Confuſion of Subſiſtences, which is all the Dean intended. But the Animadverter and his *Socinian* Seconds, or rather Leaders, repreſent the Dean's Notion, as if he made the Three Divine Perſons, as abſolute, compleat, independent Perſons, as Three Men are, and that they are united only by *Mutual conſciouſneſs*, and then they can fanſie nothing but an Unity of Knowledge, or a Moral Unity and conſent of Wills: But this is either a miſtake, or a wilful miſrepreſentation, as every one may ſee with half an Eye, who conſiders the whole Notion together.

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The Dean indeed, the better to convey this Notion of the natural Unity of *Mutual conſciouſneſs* to our Minds, ſuppoſes a Caſe, which he knew very well, never was, nor ever could be, which is very allowable in all Writers, within the compaſs of decency, when we want ſome ſenſible Images to frame our Conceptions by: And therefore ſays, *That if there were Three created Spirits ſo united, as to be conſcious to each others Thoughts and Paſſions, as they are to their own, he can ſee no Reaſon why we might not ſay, That Three ſuch Perſons are numerically One.* Though he knew, That Three ſuch particular, ſeparate Natures never could be thus united, but in them we might the better conceive, what kind of Union it was he meant. But from hence to conclude, That the Dean owns no other Unity in the Divine Nature, than what *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* would make between Three particular, abſolute, compleat, ſeparate Natures, is, I'm ſure, falſe-reaſoning, and looks like very foul Play. The Dean aſſerts, That theſe Three Divine Perſons are thus *Mutually Conſcious* to each other, and that this *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* is an eſſential Unity, and that thoſe, who are thus *Mutually Conſcious* are *numerically One*; but then he Teaches, that there are no other Three in the World that are thus *Mutually Conſcious*, and that theſe Three are not, and cannot be for this very reaſon, Three particular, ſeparate, ſubſiſting Natures, but Three Subſiſtences in one individual, numerical Nature: An Unity of Nature, and mutual conſciouſneſs may be diſtinguiſhed, but are inſeparable: There can be no Unity of Nature between Three intelligent Subſiſtences without *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*; and there can be no *Mutual-conſciouſ-*

Vindic. of Trin. p. 49.

neſs but in the ſame individual Nature; but yet, if we muſt diſtinguiſh as far as we can apprehend theſe matters, *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* is much more eſſential to the Unity of Three intelligent Subſiſtences than any other Notion of Unity: For I cannot ſee, but that if it were poſſible, That three created Spirits, who are not only Three diſtinct Subſiſtences, but have Three particular, ſeparate Natures, ſhould be thus united by *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, it would deſtroy the individuation of their Natures, though the individuation of their Subſiſtences or Perſons would be preſerved by *Self-conſciouſneſs*: And, were it poſſible, the ſame individual Nature ſhould be repeated in its Image, without this *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, it would divide this One Nature, and make the Man and his living Image, as much Two Men, as any Two Men in the World; But then the Image would ceaſe to be an Image, how exact ſoever, upon other Accounts, the Likeneſs or Sameneſs were; for the Image does not only repreſent and reſemble the Prototype, but moves and acts with it.

And this is that very *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* wherein the Dean places the eſſential and numerical Unity of the Holy Trinity; ſuch a *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* as muſt be between the Prototype and its living Image. I ſhall not trouble you with tranſcribing out of the *Vindication*, but referr you to ſome places to conſult at your leiſure.

Vindic. p. 130, 131, &c.

He always repreſents the Son, as the living Subſtantial Image of God the Father; and the eternal Generation by God's reflex Knowledge of himſelf; and in this places the numerical Identity and Sameneſs of Nature between Father and Son, as there is between the Prototype and its Image; and the Holy Spirit,

Spirit, whom the Fathers repreſent, as God's eternal Love of himſelf in his own Image, has all the ſame Divine Perfections repeated in eternal and ſubſtantial Love: That yet this numerical Identity and Unity of Nature cannot be underſtood without this *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, which makes them One Energy and Power, and is their mutual In-being in each other.

That this *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* proves the perfect equality of all Three Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead, as having the very ſame Perfections, without deſtroying the Prerogative of the Father, or the Subordination of the Son, and the Holy Spirit: As a living Image is in Nature equal with the Prototype, but Subordinate. P. 122, 123, &c. P. 81.

That this gives an Account of the *Modi ſubſiſtendi*, or of the real and actual Subſiſtence of the ſame individual, numerical Nature in Three, but in a different manner; had theſe things been duly conſidered and compared, we ſhould not have heard ſo much noiſe and clamour about *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, as if it made Three abſolute, compleat, independent Gods, when it is impoſſible to conceive a more cloſe and intimate Union in Nature. P. 83.

But there is one formidable Objection againſt all this, or rather againſt the Dean for it, that he pretends by this means to make the Notion of a *Trinity in Unity* as intelligible as the Notion of God: which is intolerable Vanity and Preſumption to pretend to explain Myſteries. But does the Dean pretend, That his Explication leaves nothing Myſterious in the Doctrine of the *Trinity in Unity*? Nothing, which we cannot comprehend? That, as the Ancients uſed to ſpeak, this is no longer *a wonderful diſtinction, and a wonderful Union*? This I con-

feſs had been very vain and preſumptuous; But are there no Myſteries in the Divine Nature, becauſe the Notion of One God is an intelligible Notion? If there be, there may be Myſteries, very incomprehenſible Myſteries in the Trinity ſtill, how intelligible ſoever the Notion be: The intelligibleneſs of any Notion, whether it be true or falſe, conſiſts in the terms in which it is conceived; that they convey a diſtinct Idea to our Minds of ſomething poſſible, not which we can fully comprehend, but which we can underſtand without confuſion or contradiction; and this does great Service to Religion to deliver Myſteries from abſurdity and contradiction, though they are very incomprehenſible ſtill.

The Notion of Eternity (for Example) is very Intelligible, to be without any Cauſe, without Beginning, and without End; there is no contradiction in this, and it is demonſtrable, that ſomething muſt be Eternal; and yet nothing can be more incomprehenſible than Eternity: Our Thoughts are preſently loſt, when we endeavour to conceive an eternal Being: And thus an eternal Image of an eternal Being, begotten without Beginning, is as intelligible, as an eternal Being is; for if it be neceſſary and eſſential to an eternal Being, to have a living, ſubſtantial Image, thought can't divide their Exiſtence; and it is as certain, if there be ſuch an eternal living Image, that this eternal Being, and his eternal Image are Two, as the Prototype and the Image; and yet as eſſentially One, and as intimately conſcious to each other, as you have heard, they muſt neceſſarily be; this is intelligible, but yet a very incomprehenſible Myſtery; for who can conceive an eternal Generation, which has no beginning?

ginning? the Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication? a Diſtinction without Separation, and an Unity without Singularity, and without Confuſion? If theſe be not Myſteries enow for the Animadverter, though the Dean's intelligible Notion were admitted, he is as much too fond of Myſteries, as other Men are too much afraid of them; for whether he knows it or no, there is a very great difference between a Myſtery, and Contradiction or Nonſence.

I believe by this time you are leſs Fond than you were, of an Anſwer to the Animadverter's Arguments, which ſome Men, who have deſpiſed his Wit and Railery, have yet thought unanſwerable; but I will be as good as my Word, eſpecially ſince a ſhort Anſwer will ſerve.

In his third Chapter he Attacks the Dean's Notion of *Self-conſciouſneſs*, but he ſtumbles at the Threſhold, and runs on furiouſly as a Man does who runs headlong, and is never able to recover himſelf. He ſays, *It is evident, the Dean aſſigns Self-conſciouſneſs as the formal reaſon of Perſonality, in all Perſons univerſally, whether Finite or Infinite, Create or uncreate*; and therefore he undertakes to prove, *That Self-conſciouſneſs is not the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, either in Finite or Infinite Perſons.* Animad. c. 3. pag. 70.

The Dean ſays not one word about *the formal Reaſon of Perſonality*, nor is at all concern'd what it is. He only ſays, *That the Unity of a Spirit with it ſelf, and its diſtinct and ſeparate Subſiſtence from all other created Spirits, conſiſts in Self-conſciouſneſs.* So that if that be one diſtinct, ſeparate Mind, which is conſcious only to it ſelf, which feels all that is in it ſelf, and nothing elſe, and thoſe be two diſtinct ſepa- Vindic. p. 48.

ſeparate Minds, each of which is thus conſcious to it ſelf, but not to each other, the Dean has gained his Point, and the Animadverter has loſt all his Arguments and Wit, whatever becomes of *the formal Reaſon of Perſonality*.

The Dean did not enquire what makes a Mind, or Spirit, or if you pleaſe a Perſon, but what makes a Mind or Spirit, or Perſon One, and either diſtinguiſhes, or ſeparates it from all other Minds, and Spirits, and Perſons; and if this be what he means by the *formal Reaſon of Perſonality*, I do affirm, That Self-conſciouſneſs is this formal Reaſon; and that for the very Reaſon he urges againſt it, That *whereſoever the formal Reaſon of Perſonality is, there is Perſonality, and whereſoever Perſonality is, there is the formal Reaſon of Perſonality*: For whereſoever there is a Perſon, there is *Self-conſciouſneſs*; that is, every Perſon is conſcious to it ſelf, and there can be no Perſon without it; and whereſoever there is *Self-conſciouſneſs*, there is by Nature a Perſon, unleſs its natural Perſonality be ſwallowed up in a Supernatural Union to a Superior Perſon, of which more preſently.

And yet to ſee what meer Mortals the niceſt Scholaſtick Wits are, who can ſpend Days and Years in picking Straws, and ſplitting Hairs, this great *Leviathan*, the Witty, the Subtle, the Good-natur'd Animadverter, knows not the difference between the formal Reaſon and ſuch a natural Property as the Logicians call *proprium quarto modo*, which belongs to the whole kind, only to the kind, and always to the kind; for ſuch Properties do *exiſt convertibly, and One mutually and eſſentially infers the other*, which is his account of the *formal Reaſon*; and thus *Riſibility* is the formal Reaſon of Humanity, which makes well for the

the Animadverter to prove him to be a Man, though he is ſeldom in ſo good a Humour as to laugh without grinning, which belongs to another Species.

But ſince he is pleaſed to let that paſs for the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, which is convertible with it, I hope *Self-conſciouſneſs* may eſcape pretty well, and paſs for *the formal Reaſon of Perſonality*. But let us hear his Arguments againſt it.

1. The firſt is worth its weight in Gold, and yet will not much enrich the Buyer, that *according to the natural Order of things*, Self-conſciouſneſs *in Perſons pre-ſuppoſes their Perſonality, and therefore is not, cannot be the reaſon of it.* Now ſuppoſe a Man ſhould reaſon thus: Actual Knowledge pre-ſuppoſes a Mind, and therefore Knowledge in its Principle is not, and cannot be the formal Reaſon of a Mind; would the Animadverter for this Reaſon deny, that the Principle of Knowledge is the formal Reaſon of a Mind, that which makes and conſtitutes a Mind, becauſe there can be no actual Knowledge before there is a Mind? and yet the Argument is the very ſame; for if Knowledge in its Principle, may be the Nature or formal Reaſon of a knowing Being, or of a Mind, though there can be no one act of Knowledge, till there is a Mind, then *Self-knowledge*, or *Self-ſenſation*, or *Self-conſciouſneſs*, may be the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, though there muſt be a Perſon, before there can be any *actual Self-conſciouſneſs*; that is to ſay, there muſt be a ſelf (which in this Diſpute is all that can be meant by Perſon) before this Self can feel it Self, and by this Self-feeling diſtinguiſh Himſelf from all other Selfs. I could not but ſmile to ſee how gravely this wiſe Animadverter proves, That *there muſt be a Perſon, before there can be any Action proceeding* Page 71.

ceeding from a Perſon, and ſummons the whole *Poſſe* of Metaphyſicks to prove it: But I hope notwithſtanding this, that *Self-conſciouſneſs* in the *Abſtract* (as the Dean uſes it, and as every one but ſuch an Animadverter would underſtand it) is as capable of being the formal Reaſon of a Perſon, as *Rationality* is of *a reaſonable Nature*, though there muſt be a reaſonable Creature before he can reaſon, as there muſt be *a Self-conſcious Nature* before there can be *actual Self-conſciouſneſs*.

But I have ſomething more to ſay to our Animadverter before I leave his *Demonſtration*, as he calls it; For as Sophiſtical as his Argument is, the Foundation of it is falſe, and abſurdly unphiloſophical: He ſays, That *Perſonality is the Ground and Principle of all Action, whereſoever it is. For where there is a* Suppoſitum, *whether it be Rational (which is another Word for Perſon) or not, ſtill it is the whole* Suppoſitum, *that Acts*. That it is the Perſon that acts is certain; but where did he learn, That *Perſonality is the Principle of all Action?* I was always taught otherwiſe, That *Natura eſt principium motus & quietis: Nature is the Principle of Motion and Reſt*, and therefore of all Action: And is there no difference between Nature and Perſonality? Is there no difference between being a reaſonable Creature, and being *Peter* or *John*? or do *Peter* or *John* perform the Actions of a reaſonable Creature, by Vertue of their being ſuch diſtinct and particular Perſons, or by their being Men, by the Powers of Humane Nature, which are common to all? Men are not diſtinguiſhed from each other, nor act and ſubſiſt ſeparately by Humane Nature; and therefore neither Humane Nature, nor any of the Powers or Actions of Humane Nature diſtin-

diſtinguiſh Men into particular Perſons, or are the Reaſon of Perſonality; but that which limits Nature, makes it particular, and a particular ſubſiſting rational Nature is a Perſon, is one with it ſelf, and diſtinguiſhed and ſeparated from all others: So that we muſt not ſeek for any formal Conſtituent Principle of Perſonality (in a ſtrict and proper Notion) as we do of Nature, but ſee in finite Beings, where Nature ends, and what are the utmoſt Bounds of it, and that diſtinguiſhes a common Nature into Perſons. Now a rational Nature extends as far as Senſation and Conſciouſneſs, and where that ends, there are the Bounds of Nature, and that makes a particular Perſon, which feels all that is in himſelf, and nothing elſe; and this is the Dean's Self-conſciouſneſs, which ſets Bounds to Nature, and by that makes a Perſon, which is one with it ſelf, and ſeparated from all others, and therefore in this Diſpute is neither to be conſidered as a Power, nor as an Action of Nature, neither direct nor reflex, but as the Bounds of it, which makes a particular ſubſiſting rational Nature, which we call a Perſon. For it is plain, that as far as Senſation and Conſciouſneſs extends, a Spirit is One, where that ends, common Nature divides, and ſubſiſts in Particulars.

I cannot but think how this Animadverter muſt look, when he reads over this Argument again, eſpecially his Triumphant Concluſion: *This I look upon as a Demonſtration of the Point; and I leave it to our Author (who is better a great deal at ſcorning the Schools, than at confuting them) to anſwer and overthrow it at his leiſure.*

2. His ſecond Argument, I confeſs, looks like ſomething ſolid and ſubſtantial, but proves a meer

airy vaniſhing Spectrum, when you come near to handle it. It is this: *The Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chriſt is perfectly conſcious to its ſelf of all the internal Acts, whether of Knowledge, Volition, Paſſion, or Deſire,* (which is One of the Paſſions) *that paſs in it, or belong to it; and yet the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chriſt is not a Perſon, and conſequently Self-conſciouſneſs is not the formal Reaſon of Perſonality; for as much as it may be in that, which is no Perſon.* Now indeed had the Dean expreſly taught, That *Self-conſciouſneſs is the formal Reaſon of Perſonality,* here had been One ſupernatural Exception againſt it, which does not alter the Reaſon of natural Unions; and yet is no greater Objection againſt Self-conſciouſneſs, than againſt the moſt approved Definition of a Perſon: For if with *Boethius*, you define a Perſon to be *ſubſtantia individua naturæ rationabilis*; an individual Subſtance of a rational Nature, the Humane Nature of Chriſt, which is an individual Subſtance of a rational Nature, and yet no Perſon is an equal Objection againſt it; and let the Animadverter try, how according to this Definition, *he can keep off the Aſſertion of* Neſtorius, *that there are Two diſtinct Perſons in Chriſt*: And if *Self-conſciouſneſs* eſcape as well as any other formal Reaſon of Perſonality, I believe the Dean deſires no more; and yet he needs not this, for he no where makes *Self-conſciouſneſs* the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, but only of the Unity and Diſtinction of a Mind or Spirit; and I hope he will grant the Humane Nature of Chriſt to be One, and to be diſtinct and ſeparated by *Self-conſciouſneſs*, from all other particular Humane Natures, or Perſons.

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The short Answer is this: That Self-consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self, and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits, and such a distinct and separate Self-conscious Mind is a natural Person, unless its own natural Personality be swallowed up in a Personal Union to a Superiour Mind. For this is the Account the Dean gives of a personal Union, when Two Natures are united into One Person, they must be so united, that the Superiour Nature have the Government of the whole Person, which is necessary to make them One Agent, without which there cannot be One Person; and that there be One Consciousness in the whole: Of which more presently. Vindic. p. 268.

3. His third Argument is draw out to a great length, but may be answered in a few Words, becuse it proceeds upon the same Mistake, and is nothing to the purpose. *It is taken from the Soul of Man in a State of Separation from the Body; that the Soul in a separate State is conscious to it self of all its own internal Acts or Motions ——— and yet the Soul in such a State is not a Person. And therefore Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality.* But whether the Soul be a Person or no Person, in the Body or out of the Body, is nothing at all to the present Controversie: If the Soul and all other Spirits are naturally One with themselves, and separated from all other Souls and Spirits by Self-consciousness; this is all the Dean desires, and all that his Hypothesis needs. And the Animadverter may philosophize as he pleases about Personalities. The Truth is, to do him right, he is a very notable Man, if he can draw you into a School-question, for he can make a shift to read and transcribe, but he hates a εὕρηκα and εὕρηκα-Men Anim. p. 73.

at his Heart, which is none of his Talent, for it requires thinking; put him out of his way, and he is undone, which makes him ſo angry at the Dean for not ſpeaking the School-Language, nor confining himſelf to known Terms of Art, which he has a great deal to ſay of, whether he underſtands them or not: and becauſe the Dean would not do this himſelf, he has done it for him, and put his Notions into School-Terms, and made *Self-conſciouſneſs* the *formal Reaſon of Perſonality*, and on my Word has diſputed very notably againſt it, and it is pity Three ſuch dead-doing Arguments ſhould be loſt for want of the *formal Reaſon of Perſonality*; and yet there is no help for it, he muſt begin all again, and try how he can prove, that the Unity of a Mind, and its diſtinction from all other Minds, does not conſiſt in Self-conſciouſneſs; and if he can prove this, then the Dean is a loſt Man for ever, and muſt be contented to follow his Triumphant Chariot.

But yet, whether this Queſtion of the Soul's being a Perſon, or no Perſon, ſerve the purpoſe of the preſent Diſpute or not, it abundantly ſerves the Animadverter's charitable purpoſe (which is the only purpoſe of his writing this Book) to expoſe the Dean; and therefore though the Matter is not worth diſputing, I ſhall make ſome ſhort Reflections on it.

The Dean has upon another occaſion aſſerted, That *a Soul without a vital Union to a Humane Body is a Perſon:* In oppoſition to this the Animadverter aſ-

Anim. p. 74. ſerts, That *the Soul of Man is not a Perſon, neither in its Conjunction with the Body, nor its Separation from it.*

The

The Foundation of his Arguments, ſuch as they are, is a very unphiloſophical and ſenceleſs Miſtake, that becauſe Man conſiſts of Soul and Body (which he very undeniably proves from the *Athanaſian Creed*) therefore the Perſonality too muſt be divided between the Soul and Body, that the Soul is but part of the Perſon, as it is part of the Man, and then the Soul neither in nor out of the Body, can be the Perſon, becauſe a part can't be the whole, *Quod erat demonſtrandum.*

Now I readily grant, That *the Perſon of a Man*, as it is uſed in common Speech to ſignifie a Man, muſt include both Soul and Body, as the conſtituent Parts of a Humane Perſon; but when we enquire into the ſtrict Notion of Perſonality, that muſt be a ſimple uncompounded thing, as indiviſible as ſelf is, which cannot conſiſt of Parts, which may be ſeparated from each other, that one part of the Perſon may live and the other die; for though there are Two Natures, there is but One Perſon, and the ſame One Perſon cannot both live and die at the ſame time.

This is a very pleaſant Notion, if well conſidered, of the two parts of Perſonality, as there are two Parts of a Man, Soul and Body; for unleſs there be two Perſonalities as well as two Natures, the two Natures cannot be two Parts of the one Humane Perſonality, as they are the Parts of a Man: It is impoſſible to prove from Two Natures, that there are Two Parts of Perſonality, unleſs each Nature has a Perſonality of its own, the Perſonality of the Body, and the Perſonality of the Soul, united into the One Perſonality of the Man; for nothing can be a part of Perſonality, which has nothing of Perſonality it ſelf.

Will

Will the Animadverter then venture to attribute any Personality to the Body, as he must do, if he makes it part of the Personality? This will be a little worse than (what he so rares the Dean for) calling a *Beast* a *Person*, tho' the Dean gave notice of the impropriety of the Expression, and used it only by way of allusion and accommodation, the better to represent the Union of Two Natures into One Person, which are Two Persons, or something as like Two Persons as their Natures will permit, when they subsist apart. And I should have thought such a severe Censurer should have been more Cautious than to have attributed any part of Personality to the Body in the same Chapter, wherein he so civilly Schools the Dean for seeming to attribute Personality to a Beast, when Personality belongs only to a reasonable Nature, and Beasts have no Reason; which is more than he knows, (for why may not Beasts have some Reason, as well as some Men have such brutish Passions) and more than as Wise Men as himself think to be true; for there are various degrees of Reason; and where ever there is a conscious Life, there must be some degree of it, and that entitles them to as much share in Personality as they have in Reason; but no Man will pretend, that a Humane Body, though united to a reasonable Soul, has any Reason, or any Sence either, though, by its Vital Union to the Soul, the Soul feels all the Impressions made on the Body.

And this brings us to a fair State, and an easie decision of this Question; for if Personality belongs only to a reasonable Nature, it is certain, that the Soul makes or constitutes the Person; or, if I may so speak, is the Center of Personality, whatever

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else be vitally united to it. And by such a vital Union is incorporated into the same Person. If there be but one principle of Reason, Sensation, and a conscious Life, that is the Person; for a Person is *the individual Substance of a Rational Nature.*

But is not a Humane Body part of the Person to whom it belongs? *Answ.* It is part of the Man, and in that Sence part of the Person, but no part of the Personality, that is, it does not make the Person, but is taken into the Person by a vital Union, and so becomes part of the Man, and part of the Person, as belonging to it.

I am of opinion, notwithstanding the Animadverter's *Animus & Anima*, that there is but one Soul or Mind, or Spirit in Man, which performs all the Offices of a Rational and Animal Life, which understands, reasons, wills, and feels all the impressions of the Body, whether Pain or Pleasure, though with respect to such different Offices and Powers, it may be of some use, both in Philosophy and Divinity, to call it by different Names. Now, if all Life, Reason, Sensation, be only in the Soul, there must be the whole Personality, though the Soul, when united to a Body, is not the whole Person; for the Person reaches as far as the Self-conscious Life does by a Vital Union, but the Personality is whole and entire in the Principle of a Rational Life, and is neither more nor less a Person, though by vital Unions, or a dissolution of them, more or less may belong to the Person: We may find some resemblance of this in Works of Art: Whether you add or take away some Wheels from a Clock, it is the same Clock still, while there is the same Spring of Motion, though it communicates Motion to more

or

or fewer Wheels. And thus the Body becomes One Person with the Soul, neither by *an hypostatical Union*, which is the swallowing up a natural Personality in its Union with a superior Person, which can never be between two Beings, one of which by Nature is no Person, as the Body it self is not, and cannot be: Nor by *the Body being joyned with the Soul, as one part, jointly concurring with another, to the composition of the whole Person*; which is the Animadverter's way, and a very absurd one, as you have already heard, to talk of a compounded Personality; but there is another way which he never thought of, and that is, by a vital Union, which makes the Body part of it self, without adding to its own Personality, by making all bodily Sensations its own. And thus, though the Soul
Animad. p. 73. be an entire Person, a Man, when united to a Body is not *an imperfect, accidental Compound, which*, he says, *Philosophy calls unum per accidens, a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One*; for his own beloved Philosophy never called things vitally united, *unum per accidens*, and I would desire him to inform us, how two things can more perfectly *coalesce* than in One Life.

However, by the power of Metaphysicks he can prove, That if the Soul be an entire Person, a Man must be an imperfect accidental compound: *For a compleat Being (as every Person essentially is) having received the utmost degree of Subsistence, which its Nature can give it, if it comes afterward to be compounded with another Being, whether compleat or incompleat, it must necessarily make such a loose unnatural Union and Composition.*

I

I do not wonder he is so fond of School-Terms, for they serve him very often instead of Sence; but before I particularly consider them, by his good leave, I must ask him a Question or two: Whether the Divine Λόγος or *Word* before the Incarnation were *a compleat Being*, as he must be, if he be the second Person in the Trinity, for *every Person*, he says, *is essentially a compleat Being*; and then, whether he will have the Humane Nature *a compleat or incompleat Being*, the Question is, Whether the Personal Union of the Humane Nature to the Divine Word, *be necessarily such a loose unnatural Union and Composition.* To say, That this is not a natural Union, is to say, That the Divine and Humane Nature are not united into One Person in Christ; for I take a Union of Natures to be a natural Union, by what Power soever it be done; at least so far, that there is no natural repugnancy to such an Union, for then no Power could do it; and therefore, according to this bold assertion, either the Hypostatical Union must be loose and unnatural, or if the Divine and Humane Nature be perfectly united into One Person, then the Union of two compleat Beings does not *necessarily make such a loose unnatural Union and Composition.*

But to quit these School-Terms, and to speak what we understand our selves, and what others may understand; the Soul may be a compleat and perfect Person, and not a perfect Man; and therefore, notwithstanding it is a compleat Being, may require a vital Union to a Humane Body, to perfect its Nature: That is a perfect Humane Person, which has entirely in it self all the Powers which are essential to a Humane Person, such as Under-

ſtanding, Will, and Senſation, which are as entire and perfect in the Soul without the Body, as with it, though ſome of them either cannot act at all, or at leaſt not ſo perfectly, without a vital Union to the Body, which conveys external Impreſſions, and by them excites internal Senſations in the Soul.

To repreſent this plainly, let us conſider a Soul vitally united to a Body, but to ſuch a Body whoſe Organs are ſo indiſpoſed for Senſation, that the Man can neither See nor Hear, nor Taſte, nor Smell, but only juſt lives and breathes, you will not ſay, this is a perfect Man; but the Animadverter himſelf will acknowledge him to be a perfect Perſon, compounded of Body and Soul; but if a compleat Perſon may not be a compleat and perfect Man, then the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, and the natural Perfection of a Man are two things; and though the vital Union of Soul and Body make a perfect Man, yet the whole entire Perſonality muſt be in the Soul, if a Man be a perfect Perſon, who is united to a Body, which is worſe than none: For where there is a perfect Humane Perſon, there muſt be the radical Principle of all Humane Actions, which can be no where but in the Soul, when the Body is unfit for all the Actions of a Rational or Senſitive Life, which is a much more imperfect State than to be out of the Body, if we believe, that the Soul lives and acts when ſeparated from the Body. Something in the Shape and Figure of a Man, without the natural Powers of Reaſon and Senſation, would very improperly be called a Man, or a Humane Perſon; and therefore we muſt confeſs, that the Soul, which under all theſe natural Impediments of acting, has

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ſtill theſe natural Powers to be the Perſon, or there can be none. The Soul is the Perſon, the Body only the Organ or Inſtrument, which, at leaſt in this ſtate of Union, is neceſſary to the exerciſe of our natural Powers, both of Reaſon and Senſation; but whatever change there be in the Body, the Perſon is the ſame ſtill, which could not be, were the Body part of the Perſon, for then the change of the Body would be a partial Change of the Perſon too; and yet our Bodies are in a perpetual Flux, and change every day; ſome Atoms fly away, and others are united to us; that we are no more the ſame for a Month or a Year, than a River is, whoſe Waters perpetually flow and change their place; and yet we feel our ſelves to be the ſame Perſons ſtill; and therefore certainly theſe fluid Atoms, of which our Bodies are compoſed, are no part of our Perſonality, though they belong to our Perſons, while they are vitally united to our Souls. Suppoſe it were poſſible, that the Souls of *John* and *Peter* could change Bodies, that the Soul of *John* ſhould be vitally united to the Body of *Peter*, and the Soul of *Peter* vitally united to the Body of *John*, I would ask the Animadverter, whether he thinks, that ſuch a change of Bodies would make any change in their Perſons? Whether *John* would not as much feel himſelf to be *John*, and *Peter* to be *Peter* as ever they did? I believe, indeed, an innocent, good-natured Soul would not be willing to venture a Change of Bodies with every Body, for fear of ſome Moral Infection, but the natural Perſon would be the ſame; for nothing makes any Body ours, but a vital Union, and whoſe Body ſoever it was before, it becomes our own, when our Soul informs it, and

feels the Impreſſions of it. Now, if the Soul be the Perſon, when united to the Body, it can't loſe its Perſonality by going out of it; nay, if the Soul can ſubſiſt in ſeparation from the Body, and live, and perform all the Actions of a Rational Nature, it muſt be a Perſon, if an individual ſubſiſting Rational Nature is a Perſon, and if it be not, I would know what to call it. But this Animadverter is a very Wagg, and Banters the poor Dean moſt unmercifully, and demonſtrates beyond all contradiction, that *The Soul, in a State of Separation, can't be a Perſon, becauſe it is neither the ſame Perſon,*

Animad. p. 76. *which the Man himſelf was while he was living, and in the Body, nor another Perſon*; and therefore it can be no Perſon. The wording of this is very obſervable, and worthy of the Wit and Subtilty of its Author: *If the Soul in ſuch a State* (of Separation) *be a Perſon, it is either the ſame Perſon which the Man himſelf was, while he was Living, and in the Body:* Pray, what is this Perſon, which he calls the *Man himſelf*, which *lives in the Body?* I hope, it is not the *Body* that *lives in the Body*, and then I know no *Man himſelf*, nor *Perſon*, that *lives in the Body*, but only the Soul; and if it be the ſame Soul that lives out of the Body, that lives in it, it is the ſame Perſon, the ſame Man himſelf in a ſtate of Separation, which lived in the Body. And what does he mean by *the ſame Perſon, which the Man himſelf was, while living?* For does the Man and his Perſon die? Then the Man is not Immortal, and if the Man and his Perſon live, when the Body dies, then the Soul is the Man and the Perſon, and the very ſame Perſon out of the Body that it was in it. So St. *Paul* thought, when, ſpeaking of himſelf, and his being taken

taken up into the Third Heavens, he thus expreſſes it. *I knew a Man in Chriſt fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth) ſuch an one caught up into the third Heavens*, 2 *Cor.* 12. 2. but whether in the Body, or out of the Body, which he did not know, yet he knew himſelf to be the ſame Man, and the ſame Perſon that ever he was.

But the Animadverter very learnedly proves, That the Soul out of the Body cannot be the ſame Perſon with the Man, becauſe the Soul is not the Soul and Body too, as the Man is when the Soul and Body are united; which is well obſerved, That the Soul is not the Body, nor a part the whole: but yet if the Perſonality be not compounded of Soul and Body, the Soul may be the whole and ſame Perſon in the Body, and out of it.

There is no need then to ſay, That the Soul in a State of Separation is another Perſon, than the Man himſelf is while Soul and Body are united; though this would ſerve the Dean's purpoſe as well, if the Soul be but a Perſon, and be a diſtinct Perſon by Self-conſciouſneſs: And ſhould the Dean prove croſs, and ſay this, the Animadverter could not help himſelf; for as for his *abſurd Conſequence*, viz. *That it is One Perſon that lives well or ill in this World, to wit, the Man himſelf while he was perſonally in the Body*, which (by the way) is down-right Nonſence, if the Perſon of the Man be Soul and Body, though we confeſs the Body belongs to his Perſon, when united to his Soul, for *the perſonal Preſence of the Man in the Body*, muſt diſtinguiſh the Perſon of the Man from the Body, in which he is *perſonally* preſent, and ſuppoſes, that the ſame Man at other

times

times may not be *perſonally* preſent in the Body; however he thinks it a great Abſurdity, That *One Perſon ſhould live well or ill in this World and another Perſon paſs out of the Body into Heaven or Hell, there to be rewarded or puniſhed, (at leaſt till the Reſurrection)* (and I ſuppoſe at longeſt too, unleſs it can be another Perſon when reunited to the Body, as well as when ſeparated from it) *for what that other Perſon had done well or ill upon Earth.*

Well, let this be as abſurd as it will, the Animadverter muſt ſay it, or ſay ſomething as abſurd, unleſs he will allow a Soul in a State of Separation to be the ſame Perſon that it was in the Body, or deny the intermediate Rewards and Puniſhments of good and bad Men till the Reſurrection. For if the Soul be a Perſon, and not the ſame, then one Perſon ſins and another ſuffers. If a Man be a Perſon, and the Soul no Perſon, then the Perſon ſins, and that which is no Perſon ſuffers: If a Man be a whole Perſon; and the Soul only part of the Perſon, then the whole Sins, and a part ſuffers for the whole. Let him chooſe which he thinks *looks moſt agreeable to the Principles of Reaſon and Divinity.*

But does this profound Philoſopher indeed think, that the Body either ſins or ſuffers? The Soul ſins in and by the Body, and feels Pain or Pleaſure from bodily Impreſſions; and therefore as the Body may be made the Inſtrument of Vertue or Vice, ſo it may be the Inſtrument of Rewards and Puniſhments; but Vertue or Vice is ſeated only in the Soul, and it is the Soul only that can be happy or miſerable, rewarded or puniſhed, in or out of the Body, and therefore there is no danger, that one ſhould ſin, and another ſuffer, though the Soul ſins in the Body, and ſuffers out of it.

But

But it is worth obſerving how notably he winds up his Argument. *If it be intolerably abſurd (as no doubt it is) That the Soul in the other World ſhould not be reſponſible for what the Man himſelf in Perſon had done in this:* What then? One would expect the Concluſion ſhould be, then *the Soul is the Man himſelf in Perſon.* But this he durſt not ſay, becauſe it was to un-ſay all he had ſaid; and he durſt not ſay the contrary, for that is the Abſurdity he is expoſing, that One, who is not the *Man himſelf, ſhould ſuffer for what the Man himſelf did:* and therefore he lets them both ſlip, and is very glad to get rid of them, and concludes ſafely; *Then it is altogether as abſurd and intolerable, for any one to repreſent and ſpeak of theſe things under ſuch Terms and Notions, as muſt neceſſarily throw all Diſcourſe and Reaſoning about them into Paradox and Confuſion*; which is to bilk a Concluſion, and to pay a reckoning by running out at the Back-door. He adds: *And indeed to me the Soul's thus changing its State forwards and backwards from one manner of ſubſiſting to another, looks very odd and unnatural.* What does he mean by this? That it is *odd and unnatural*, that the Soul ſhould live in the Body and out of the Body, and then return into the Body again? And is not this ſo? Does not the Soul firſt live in the Body, and after what we call Death, live out of the Body, and ſhall it not be reunited to the Body again at the Reſurrection? And how does this change the Soul's *manner of ſubſiſting*, any more than the Body changes its manner of ſubſiſting, when it is naked and cloathed? To live in the Body and out of the Body, are Two different States of Life, but the Soul ſubſiſts ſtill in the ſame manner, for it owes not its Subſiſtence to the Body, and can neither ſubſiſt more nor leſs in or out of the Body;

for

for I know no degrees of Subſiſtence in the Soul, though there are of Life and Action; what is, is, and what ſubſiſts continues to be.

But that which is *ſo odd and unnatural* is, *that from an incompleat State in the Body, it ſhould paſs to a perſonal and compleat State out of the Body (which State is yet præternatural to it) and then fall back into an incompleat State again by its re-union to the Body at the Reſurrection (which yet one would think, ſhould rather improve our principal Parts, in all reſpects, not meerly relating to the Animal Life, as the bare Subſiſtence of them, I am ſure, does not.)*

It is hard to gueſs the meaning of ſuch Gypſie-Cant, and therefore I hope you and he will pardon me if I miſtake, for I will do my beſt. By the Soul's *incompleat State in the Body*, I ſuppoſe, he means, That the Soul in the Body is *an incompleat Perſon*, and by the *perſonal compleat State out of the Body*, that the Soul is *a compleat Perſon out of the Body*; this indeed ſounds ſomewhat *odd and unnatural*; but does he know any Man who ſays, that the Soul is an *incompleat Perſon in the Body*, and a *compleat Perſon out of the Body?* or who calls this the *incompleat* and the *compleat State of the Soul?* Thoſe who affirm the Soul to be the Perſon, ſay, That it is the ſame Perſon in the Body, and out of it, but that it lives in different States in the Body and out of it; and that its State in this mortal Body, is the moſt imperfect State a reaſonable Soul can live in; That the State of the Soul in ſeparation from the Body, is to good Men a more perfect and compleat, becauſe a more happy State, and therefore not *præternatural*, which can never be a more happy State; and that the re-union of the Soul to an immortal ſpiritual Body at the Reſurrection, is the moſt compleat and perfect

perfect State of all: So that here is no such *unnatural change* as he dreams of, from an *incompleat to a compleat præternatural State* (which is Nonsence) and then back again to an *incompleat State at the Resurrection*, which so turned his own Stomach, (though not very squeamish) that he was glad to qualifie it with a Parenthesis, which I defie any Man to make Sence of: But the natural progress of the Soul in this lapsed State is from a less perfect to a more perfect, and from that to the most perfect State of Life; which to me is proof enough that the Soul is the Person, and fitted by Nature to live in all these different States, or it is impossible to prove *Peter* or *John* to be the same Men in these different States.

At length the Animadverter grew sensible, that it sounds very absurdly to say, That the Soul in a State of Separation is but *part of the Person*, when it subsists by it self, not *in any Compound*, and feels it self to be the same, and lives and acts in a more perfect and happy State, than when it lived in a mortal Body, and therefore he fences against these Two Objections (which are stronger, when they are put into one) as well as he can. Animad. p. 48.

He says, the Soul *in a State of Separation* is but part of the Person, the whole of which is a compound of Soul and Body, because of *its essential relation to a Compound*. But what is this *Compound* which the Soul is *essentially related to*? not the Body I hope, for the Body is no more the Compound, than the Soul: Is it then the Man? and where is this Man that the Soul is essentially related to? Does he then mean, that it is essential to the Soul to live in an earthly Body? Then it cannot live in a State of Separation. If it be of the Essence of the Soul to live in the Body,

it is evident, That it can never live out of it; and if it be not essential, then the Soul may be a whole entire Person, when it subsists separate from the Body. But the Soul *by its original Designation* is related to the Body; What? so that it cannot live without it, and never should live without it? if not, this *original Designation*, does not prove an *essential Relation*: But *it has a natural Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound*. What does he mean by the Soul's *being an Ingredient in a Compound?* Is the Soul and Body mixed and blended together to make a Man? Is it the same thing to be a part of the whole, and to be an *Ingredient in a Compound?* Well, but the Soul has *a natural Aptitude* to live in a Body; and so it has to live out of the Body; and what then? then the Soul, which is the same Person still, is naturally fitted to live in different States; and then its *Relation* to an *earthly Body* is not essential to it, whatever *strong Appetite and Inclination*, as he says, *it retains to return and be re-united to the Body*; which, whoever says it, no Man can know; and if it be true of sensual Souls, who were wholly immersed in Sense, is demonstratively false of all holy and pure Spirits, who are in a great measure weaned from this Body, while they live in it, and rejoyce at their Deliverance when they escape safe out of it, who, with St. *Paul*, desire *to be absent from the Body, and to be present with the Lord*. Holy Souls indeed in a State of Separation do earnestly desire the Completion of their Happiness in the Resurrection of their Bodies, but not to be re-united to these vile, earthly, corruptible Bodies, but to glorified, immortal, incorruptible Bodies, when Christ shall at his Appearance *change our vile Bodies, and make them like to his own most glorious Body*; which though

though they had every individual Atome, which belonged to them before, are yet in their Nature and Constitution no more the same Bodies, than Earth and Heaven are the same. But *the Spirits of just Men made perfect* are in a more perfect State of Life and Happiness out of these Bodies than they enjoyed in them, and therefore are more perfect Persons too, are more perfectly themselves, and enjoy themselves more perfectly, and therefore are in a State more agreeable to the Perfection of their Natures (and that I take to be *a natural State*) than living in these Bodies.

The Animadverter will not allow this to be *a natural, but Supernatural Perfection, which relates only to the Consummation of their Graces, and not to the manner of their Subsistence.* But is not *the Perfection of our Graces* the Perfection of Humane Nature? And is not the Perfection of Nature, *a natural Perfection?* And if the Soul be more perfect in a State of Separation, is not this a *more perfect manner of Subsistence?* This might have shamed the Animadverter had he had a little more Consideration and less Confidence, to deny the Personality of the Soul, which can subsist and act, and be more perfect and happy out of the Body; which shews, that to be in the Body, or out of it, does not concern the Personality, but the different States wherein the same Person lives.

To proceed. The Man had upon another occasion said, That *all the Sufferings and Actions of the Body are attributed to the Man, though the Soul is the Person, because it is the Superiour and Governing Power, and constitutes the Person.* This I should have thought very true and safe, but the Animadverter has made very tragical Work with it. He says, That this proves the quite contrary, That *the Man himself, to whom* Pag. 79.

theſe perſonal Acts are aſcribed, muſt indeed be the Perſon, and that for the ſame Reaſon alſo the Soul cannot be ſo. But does the Dean any where deny, That the Man, as conſiſting of Soul and Body, is a Humane Perſon? or, when united to a Body, affirm, that the Soul is the whole Perſon? He ſays indeed, That the Soul is the ſeat of Perſonality, the only Principle of Reaſon, Senſation, and a Conſcious life, which conſequently in a State of Separation is the Perſon, and when united to the Body conſtitutes the Perſon, and therefore may both be *the Perſon, and conſtitute the Perſon.* When a Body is vitally united to a Soul, Soul and Body are but One Perſon, becauſe they are but One voluntary Agent, and have but One Conſcious Life; but it is the Soul conſtitutes the Perſon, as being the Principle of all perſonal Acts, Senſations and Paſſions which the Body is only the Inſtrument of, but being a vital Inſtrument is united to the Perſon, and becomes One Perſon with the Soul; for the Perſon reaches as far as the ſame Conſcious Life does; but it is only this vital Union to the Soul, which receives the Body into the Unity of the ſame Perſon, not as part of the Perſon, but as an animated Inſtrument of Life and Action, which as it were, cements Soul and Body into One Perſon. A Soul vitally united to a Body, is an *embodied* Perſon, in a State of Separation it is the ſame Perſon ſtill, but without a Body, which makes a great change in its Senſations, and manner of acting, but no more changes the Perſon, than the Man would be changed cloathed or uncloathed, were his Cloths as vitally united to his Body, as his Body is to his Soul. This is plain Sence; and if the Animadverter knows not how to reduce it to Terms of Art, I cannot help it. *The Soul,* I grant,

grant, as he wisely observes, *Cannot constitute the Person efficiently, by Creation or Generation,* not *formally* as *a constituent part*, for the Soul is not properly part of the Person, but the Soul constitutes an embodied Person, by living and acting in the Body, which unites Soul and Body into one Life, and that makes one embodied Person, or Soul and Body one Man. And now, as for those Questions, which, with so much Triumph and Scorn he asks the Dean, I leave to himself to Answer them, and to you to laugh at them. The rest of this Chapter is nothing but Ignorance and Raving, and has been answered already. Pag. 80.

If you will Pardon this long excursion about the Personality of the Soul, which is nothing at all to the present Controversie, having given you this one sufficient taste of the Wit and Philosophy of the Animadverter and his great exactness in speaking and reasoning, I promise you to let pass an hundred other Absurdities and Fooleries, and to make shorter Work with him, without letting slip any Argument, when I can find it.

The Title of his Fourth Chapter is an Answer to it self, and proves, That it is nothing to the purpose. For he undertakes to prove, That *Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the blessed Trinity*, nor does the Dean say it is. The Question is only this, whether Three *Self-consciousnesses* do not prove Three Persons, each of which is thus Self-conscious to himself, to be really distinct from each other? Whether Three Persons who feel themselves to be themselves, and not to be each other, are not Three really distinct Persons? This mistake has been so fully exposed Anim. *Chap.* 4. *p.* 90.

posed already, that I need say no more of it; for the Mistake is the same, and the Answer is the same, when applied to finite or infinite Persons.

To keep my Word with you, I shall take no notice at present of his Nine Considerations, which are ushered in with a kind of Mathematical Pomp, as if we were to expect nothing less than demonstration; when I see what end they serve, they shall be examined. But now for his Arguments, which will be answered in almost as few Lines, as they take up Pages in the Animadversions; for when the Question is mistaken, all Arguments are lost.

Pag. 94. Arg. 1. *No Personal Act can be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is* (nor, I suppose, in the Person whose Act it is not) *But Self-consciousness is a Personal Act, and therefore cannot be the formal Reason*, &c. This Argument we have met with, and answered before; The Dean neither considered *Self-consciousness* as *a personal Act*, nor assigned it as the *formal Reason of Personality*; and yet if we consider *Self-consciousness* as a *Personal Act*, though it cannot make the Person, yet it distinguishes one Person from another; by this actual *Self-consciousness* every Person feels himself to be himself, and not to be another.

Arg. 2. Proceeds upon the same mistake, as to *the formal reason of Personality*, but has some peculiar Absurdities of its own; for he proves, That *Self-consciousness* can't make a Person, because it can't make the Relations, which distinct Persons stand in to each other. That *Self-consciousness* can't make a Father, because it can't beget a Son. For this is the Summ of his Argument, That the Three Persons in the Trinity are related to each other, as Father, Son, and

and Holy Ghost; and therefore *Self-consciousness*, which is an absolute and *irrelative thing* cannot be the formal Reason of Personality, because it is not the formal Reason of these Relations: As if (let the formal Reason of Personality be what it will) the *fundamentum relationis*, or the foundation of the Relation between Persons, and the formal Reason of Personality were the same thing: Does that which makes *John* a Person, make him a Father, or that which makes *Peter* a Person, make him a Son?

This, I suppose, will be acknowledged very absurd in Humane Persons, where every Person has *a distinct absolute Nature* to be the subject of these Relations, for then the Personality and the Relation must differ; but it is otherwise with the *Persons of the Trinity*, whose *Personalities* are meer *Relations*. But with the Animadverter's good leave, this makes no difference: In what Sence the Divine Persons are *Relatives* or *Relations*, I have already explained; That they subsist relatively to each other, as the whole Subsistence of the Image is relative to its Prototype; but the same Divine Nature which subsists distinctly in each of them, is a compleat absolute Nature, and *Self-consciousness* may distinguish the same Nature into different Persons, though they subsist in relation to each other: For has the Person and his Relation the same Notion and formal Reason? Is the Father his Paternity, the Son his Filiation, and the Holy Ghost his Procession? if not, then the formal Reason of Personality in the Father and Son, differs from the Foundation of the Relation between Father and Son; and *Self-consciousness* might be the formal Reason of the Personality, though not of the Relation.

But

But, have each of these Three Persons, who, as he says, are *purely Relative*, a Self-consciousness of their own, that the Father knows himself to be the Father, and not the Son; and the Son knows himself to be the Son, and not the Father, *&c.* This distinguishes the Persons, and proves them to be really distinct, which is all the Dean desires.

Pag. 101. *Arg.* 3. His next Argument is just as much to the purpose as the former. *If Self-consciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons, then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing it self, but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the Deity, as well as Three.* Now, had the Dean said, That *Self-consciousness* made the *Trinity*, this had been a notable Argument, but, I hope, *Self-consciousness* may distinguish the Three Persons in the Trinity, and prove them to be Three really distinct Persons, though there be but Three, and not Three Thousand Persons in the Godhead. Though it be not repugnant to the Nature of *Self-consciousness*, it may be repugnant to the Nature of the Deity, that there should be more than Three Persons in the Godhead. Self-consciousness proves the distinction, though it does not limit the number of Persons, which no Man ever dreamt of, and none but an ingenious Blunderer, whose subtilty is too great for his Understanding, could ever have thought of.

And yet this Argument is as very a *Non-sequitur* as ever I met with; for suppose *Self-consciousness* were *the formal Reason of Personality*, how does it follow, that *there may be Three Thousand Persons in the Deity*; for does *the formal Reason of Personality* make or limit the number of Persons? The Nature of the thing,

thing, and the Will of the Maker may, but whatever be the formal Reason of Personality, there can be no more Persons than Nature will admit; and if the eternal, uncreated Nature will admit but of Three Persons, it is impossible that *Self-consciousness*, tho' it were the formal Reason of Personality could make more; for there can be no more when the Divine Nature will admit but of Three Self-Conscious Persons, though a created Nature will admit of as many as God pleases to make. In short, that which naturally distinguishes Three Persons from each other, would distinguish Three Thousand, if there were so many; but does not prove, That there may be Three Thousand Persons in the Godhead; for though it is no contradiction to the distinction of Persons, by *Self-consciousness*, that there should be Three Thousand, yet it may be a contradiction to the Perfection of the Divine Nature, because every Divine Person is eternal, and whatever is eternal doth necessarily exist; and therefore if there be but Three Divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, there never can be, nor ever could have been more.

Arg. 4. His fourth and last Argument is a great Master-piece of profound Reason and Judgment. *If Three distinct Self-consciousnesses formally constitute Three distinct Personalities, then Three distinct Self-complacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too.* Pag. 104. He might as well have added Self-Love, and Self-Displeasure, and Self-Condemnation, and as many *Selfs* as he could think of, only the Danger then was, That the Personality should alter with the Judgment or Passion, that the Person should not be the same, when he is pleased and displeased, when he applauds and acquits, or condemns himself.

ſelf. Had he added *Self-conſcious* to all this; as a *Self-conſcious complacency* (for then it is the ſame thing, whether *Self* or any other Being be the object of the complacency) a *Self-conſcious* Love, or Fear, or Hatred, or Deſire, every one of theſe Acts would prove a diſtinct Perſon, becauſe they are the Acts of Self-conſciouſneſs, which diſtinguiſh one Perſon from another, as every Act of Reaſon proves a reaſonable Creature, becauſe it is the exerciſe of Rationality; but yet no Man will ſay, that it is every Act, but the principle of Reaſon, which makes a reaſonable Creature; and no more does any particular Act, but the principle of Self-conſciouſneſs, diſtinguiſh between Self-conſcious Perſons, much leſs ſuch Acts as may be ſeparated from the Perſon, as, I doubt, *Self-complacency* is from Damned Spirits, or if he will not allow Souls to be Perſons, as it will be from Damned Men. He has drawn this Argument out to ſuch a length, and has ſo many pretty Remarks, that I have much ado to keep my word with you, but let him go like a wrangling Wit as he is, and I'll go on.

As *Self-conſciouſneſs* makes a Perſon one with it ſelf, and diſtinguiſhes it from all other Perſons, ſo the Dean apprehends, That a natural *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* makes Three Perſons as naturally One, as it is poſſible for Three to be One; and that is the Unity of the Godhead, not the Unity of One Perſon, but the Unity of Three, or a *Trinity in Unity*: And this is his next Attempt, to prove, That the Unity of Three Divine Perſons in the Godhead can't conſiſt in *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*. He proceeds upon the ſame miſtake, and therefore the ſame Anſwer will ſerve: By *Self-conſciouſneſs* he underſtood, as you have ſeen, the acts of *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and then

then the act Supposing a Person could not be the formal Reason of Personality; and thus by *Mutual-consciousness* he understands the Acts of *Mutual-consciousness*, which supposes the Unity of Nature, and therefore cannot be the cause or reason of it; now, though I know not of what use that Dispute is, about *the Priority of Being, and the first Modes and Affections of it to any Act of Knowledge*, or any other Acts; especially when we speak of the Divine Nature, which we know has no Modes and Affections, no Priority so much as in Conception, if we conceive aright of him, between his Being, and a pure and simple Act; yet I will not put the Animadverter out of his way, when there is no need of it, an easie obvious distinction between the Principle and the Act answers all: A Self-conscious Principle, without which we can't conceive a Mind, makes a Mind one with it self, and distinguishes it from all other Minds, and by the Acts of *Self-consciousness*, which suppose the Principle, every Mind feels it self to be One, and distinguished from all others: And thus the natural Principle of *Mutual-consciousness* between Three Persons unites them inseparably in One Nature, and *the Acts of Mutual-consciousness* are the Acts of Unity, whereby they know and feel themselves to be essentially in each other, and therefore to be essentially One: Just as we consider *Reason*, either as the Principle or as the Act, the first constitutes a reasonable Nature, the second is the actual exercise of Reason; and thus all his Arguments vanish like Smoak, rise in a dark Cloud, but immediately disperse and are seen no more, till they return, as such Vapours use to do, in Thunder and Lightning, or some threatning Storm.

1. His first Argument is this, *No Act of Know-* Pag. 107.

ledge can be the formal Reaſon of an Unity of Nature in the Perſons of the bleſſed Trinity: But an Act of Mutual-conſciouſneſs is an Act of Knowledge. Ergo. Nothing will ſatisfie the Animadverter but *formal Reaſons*, whereas the Dean no where aſſerts, That *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* is the formal Reaſon of this Unity, but that Three Perſons, who are thus *Mutually-conſcious* to each other, muſt be eſſentially One; nor does the Dean place this Unity in an *Act of Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, which ſignifies the Principle as well as the Act, and then *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* (if it were no more than Knowledge, of which preſently) muſt not be conſidered as *an Act of Knowledge.*

Arg. 2. *If Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons be the Cauſe, Reaſon, or Principle of Mutual-conſciouſneſs in the ſaid Perſons, then their Mutual-conſciouſneſs is not the Cauſe or Reaſon of the Unity of their Nature; but the former is true, and therefore the latter is ſo too.*

If by this he means, That theſe Divine Perſons could not be thus *Mutually conſcious*, except they were eſſentially One, it is true, but nothing to the purpoſe, for they may be thus eſſentially One by *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, or *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* may be eſſential to this Unity, though they could not be thus actually conſcious to each other, unleſs they were thus united, as to have and to feel each other in themſelves. If by *the Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons*, he means the Sameneſs and *Homoouſiotes* of Nature; this I grant is a neceſſary Foundation for Mutual-conſciouſneſs, without which they could not be One, nor mutually conſcious to each other; but I deny that it is the *immediate* Cauſe, Reaſon, or Principle of Mutual-conſciouſneſs: The ancient Fathers were very ſenſible, That when the ſame Nature ſubſiſted diſtinctly in Three diſtinct Perſons, the

the meer *Sameneſs* and *Homoouſiotes* of Nature could not make this eſſential Unity; and therefore they added, their *Perichoreſis* or the mutual *In-being* of theſe Divine Perſons in each other, which the Dean calls *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, which is the only natural Union and *In-being* of Minds.

He proves, That *Unity of Nature is the Cauſe and Principle of Mutual-conſciouſneſs, becauſe Mutual-conſciouſneſs is an eſſential Property equally belonging to all the Three Perſons*, and therefore as *all Properties and internal Attributes do*, muſt *iſſue and reſult from the Eſſence and Nature, and therefore can have no antecedent cauſal influx upon the ſame Nature, ſo as to conſtitute either the Being or the Unity of it.* Now, I grant, That *Mutual-conſcionſneſs* does *equally belong to all Three Perſons*, for they are all mutually-conſcious to each other, and I grant, that it is eſſential to the Divine Nature, as to ſubſiſt in Three diſtinct Perſons, ſo in Three mutually-conſcious Perſons; but yet Mutual-conſciouſneſs belongs not immediately to Nature but to Perſons, and is that intimate Union of Perſons which conſiſts in feeling each other in themſelves.

The Dean will leave the Animadverter to Philoſophize by himſelf concerning *antecedent cauſal influxes on the Divine Nature, to conſtitute the Being or the Unity of it*; He pretends to no ſuch Knowledge of Created Nature, much leſs of an eternal, ſelf-originated, ſimple, uncompounded Nature: It contents him to know what is eſſential, not abſolutely to the Unity of the Divine Nature, but to the Unity in Trinity, and if *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* be eſſential to this Unity, that the Three Divine Perſons are thus united, and cannot be One without it, he will contend no farther

farther with any Man about it. And it is certain, This is essential to his Notion of an identical and numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, when the same individual Nature is repeated in its living Image, for it is essential to the Notion of a living Image, not only perfectly to represent the Nature, but to feel all the Motions of the Prototype, to live, and move, and act with it, as the Face in the Glass answers all the Features and Motions of the Face it represents.

But the Animadverter mistakes the whole Matter, as is evident from what follows: *The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons, there is upon this account, one and the same Knowledge in them also; and they are not One in Nature, by Vertue of their Mutual-Consciousness; but are therefore mutually-conscious, because the perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so.*

If by *one and the same Knowledge*, he means knowing the same things, this I grant is owing to the *Sameness* of Nature, but is not *Mutual-consciousness*; for Three Persons, who have the same Nature, may know the same things, without feeling each others Thoughts and Knowledge in themselves: If by *one and the same Knowledge* he means, That the Knowledge of the Divine Nature in Three Persons, is but One individual Act, as the Knowledge of One single Person is, this destroys the distinction of Persons, which cannot be distinct without distinct personal Acts, as Knowledge is, and destroys *Mutual-consciousness*; for there is no place for *Mutual-consciousness*, or Mutual-Knowledge, where there is but One single Act of Knowledge: If by *one and the same Knowledge* he means what *Gregory Nyssen* calls, μία τῆς ἀγαθῆς βουλή-

ματος

μιᾶς κινήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως, One motion and disposition of the good will, which passes through the whole Trinity ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀδιαστάτως, without any distance of time, or propagating the Motion from one to t'other, but is distinctly in them all by one Sensation, like One Thought in One numerical Mind; this is that very *Mutual-consciousness* the Dean means, and is essential, not to the Unity of the Divine Nature absolutely considered, but as repeated in its Image: Three such distinct Subsistences of the same individual Nature, are by Mutual-consciousness essentially One; and thus he may take his *Risibility* again; for he is undone if he parts with it.

3. Arg. *To affirm Mutual-consciousness to be the cause of the Union of the Three Divine Persons in the same Nature, is to confound the Union and Communion of the said Persons together.*

To affirm, That the Three Divine Persons are essentially One by Mutual-consciousness is not to affirm, that Mutual-consciousness is the Cause of the Union, but that Persons thus united, whatever makes this Union, are essentially One: The Union of the Father and Son in the same Nature, is by eternal Generation, or the Father's begetting a Son in his own Likeness, not *without* but *within* himself, and the Union of the Holy Ghost, with Father and Son, is by his eternal Procession from Father and Son, without Separation, or going out of either; but this In-being of these Divine Persons in each other is their *Mutual-consciousness*; for they are in one another, as Minds, not as Bodies, and we know no other natural Union or In-being of Minds, but this natural intimate Consciousness to each other.

But

But his Argument consists *in confounding the Union and Communion of these Divine Persons*; for it seems their *Communion* consists in this *Mutual-consciousness*; and if their Union consists in it too, then their Union and Communion is the same: And what if it be? Can he tell of any Communion between Persons essentially One (excepting such personal Acts as are peculiarly ascribed to each in the Oeconomy of our Salvation, which are not the Communion of *Mutual-consciousness*) distinct from their essential Unity. In separate Persons, who have no natural Union, Unity and Communion are Two things; for where there is no natural Union, Communion can only signifie a Moral or Political Union; but all Communion is Union; and where the Union is natural, Union and Communion must be the same: For Persons which are essentially One, which is the most perfect Union, can admit of no lower Degrees of Union, which are only Imitations of Nature, to supply the want of natural Unity. So that the Animadverter has unawares proved the essential Union of the Divine Persons to consist in Mutual-consciousness; for if their Communion consists in it, as he grants, then their Union must.

But he has made a very false Representation both of *Mutual-consciousness*, and of the *Communion* of the Divine Persons with each other. For to prove *Mutual-consciousness* to be *Communion*, he says, *That all Acts of several Persons upon one another (as all that are Mutual must be) are properly Acts of Communion, by which the said Persons have an Intercourse amongst themselves, as acting interchangeably one upon the other*; which may be true of *separate* Persons, and of all other *Mutual Acts*, excepting *Mutual-consciousness*: But Persons, though distinct, yet not separate, but essentially

ſentially One by Mutual-conſciouſneſs, do not act upon each other (which muſt ſignifie an external Impreſſion, which one Perſon makes upon the other, and that ſuppoſes them to be ſeparate Perſons) but ſee, and know, and feel each other in themſelves, as every ſingle individual Mind feels its own Thoughts and Paſſions. Had the Dean made ſuch a Separation between the Divine Perſons, as this looſe Deſcription of Communion infers, what tragical Exclamations ſhould we have heard?

But this ſevere Cenſurer of other Men ought to have been more cautious than to have ſaid, *That all Acts of ſeveral Perſons upon one another, are Acts of Communion*, which makes Boys in a State of Communion with each other at Boxing; and a match at Scolding another State of Communion; that had the Dean but been pleaſed to have returned Mutual Acts, he and the Animadverter might long before this, have been in *very ſtrict Communion* with each other.

After all this huffing and ſwaggering, this notable Diſpute iſſues in a meer Metaphyſical Subtlety about the natural Order of our Conceptions of things. The Animadverter grants all that the Dean ſays, and all that he has need to ſay in order to form a Notion of a Trinity in Unity. In the Diſpute about *Self-conſciouſneſs*, he no where denies, but in all his Arguments ſuppoſes, that every individual Perſon has a *Self-conſciouſneſs* of its own, and that every ſuch *Self-conſcious* Perſon is thereby one with it ſelf, and diſtinguiſh'd from all other Perſons; but he will not allow *Self-conſciouſneſs* to be the *formal Reaſon of Perſonality*, which the Dean no where ſays it is; and as for *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, he allows the Three Divine Perſons, to be thus *mutually-conſcious*;

and that this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs may ſuppoſe an Union of Nature* (the Dean would have ſaid *Unity of Nature*, though an *Union of Perſons*; for Unity is Oneneſs, Union is a Conjunction of more than One; and therefore there can be no *Union* of Nature, unleſs there be a number of Natures united into One, but there is an Union of Perſons in the Unity of Nature) and that *Mutual-conſciouſneſs may reſult* from this Union, *and upon the ſame account may infer and prove it, but it can never give or cauſe it; for their Eſſence and Perſonality* (what but *One Perſonality*, as One Eſſence in Three?) *muſt ſtill go before their Mutual-conſciouſneſs, ſince the Three Perſons muſt be really One in Nature before they can know themſelves to be ſo. To be ſo?* How is that? To be One? That they muſt be One, before they can know themſelves to be One? What is that to the purpoſe? Can they be One before they are Mutually-conſcious, even in the order of conceiving it? Can they be One before they are in one another? Or is there any other mutual In-being of Minds, but Mutual-conſciouſneſs?

But what confounded work does this make with the pure, ſimple, uncompounded, eternal Nature of God to prove a Priority or Poſteriority of Being, or Cauſality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions? When we certainly know, that the Divine Nature is eternal, and therefore has nothing before, nor after in it; that it has no Parts or Compoſition, and therefore nothing in order of Nature before or after, nothing that can be conceived as a Cauſe or Effect, is it not demonſtrable, that all ſuch Conceptions, reduced into ſuch exact Order and Method, are falſe, becauſe there is nothing in the Divine nature, that anſwers to them? And though the imper-

imperfection of our Knowledge makes it neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the Divine Nature into different Conceptions, as far as we can know any thing of God, and can form diſtinct Notions, which we can view by Parts; Is this a Reaſon to frame Ideas of Priority and Poſteriority, of Cauſes and Effects, of formal Reaſons and eſſential Properties, when we know there is no ſuch thing in God, and can form no diſtinct Conceptions of them? Is it not a wiſe Diſpute, whether Eſſence, Subſiſtence, Perſonality, the diſtinction of Perſons, or the Unity of Nature, Self-conſciouſneſs, and Mutual-conſciouſneſs, be firſt or laſt, which is the Cauſe, and which the Effect; when we know that the Divine Nature did eternally ſubſiſt in Three Self-conſcious, and mutually-conſcious Perſons, and have no other Conception of their Diſtinction and Unity?

But let thoſe diſtinguiſh and methodize their Conceptions into unconceivable Confuſion, that pleaſe; if Self-conſciouſneſs neceſſarily reſults from, and infers and proves a diſtinction of Perſons, and Mutual-conſciouſneſs *ſuppoſes, reſults from, infers, and proves*, the Union of the Divine Perſons in the eſſential Unity of the Godhead, it will ſatisfie the Dean without diſputing the formal Reaſons of Perſonality and Union: For this proves a Trinity in Unity, and gives us as intelligible a Notion of it, as we have of Three diſtinct Self-conſcious Perſons, which are mutually conſcious to each other, which either makes or proves an eſſential Diſtinction and Unity; and to diſpute about the Cauſe of Self-conſciouſneſs or Mutual-conſciouſneſs, is to diſpute about the naked Eſſences, or eſſential Properties of things, which the Dean rejected from the beginning, as without the Compaſs of Humane Knowledge. Vindic. p. 8.

Pag. 100. 4. His fourth and laſt Argument diſcards *the Notion of Self-conſciouſneſs and Mutual-conſciouſneſs, not only as new and ſuſpicious, but as wholly needleſs in this Subject.* Why ſo? Pray what hurt have theſe ſeemingly innocent Words done? Are they not Engliſh? Do they ſignifie nothing? Or can't he underſtand them? The laſt is the truth of the Caſe, and it is a hard caſe, that the Dean muſt be bound, at the peril of having a great ſcolding Book writ againſt him, to furniſh the Animadverter with Underſtanding, if he venture upon any Terms, which he can't find in ſome Orthodox Schoolmen, for *Peter Lombard* will not paſs muſter with him.

But the Sum of all is, That *nothing can be ſignified by theſe Words (Self-conſciouſneſs and Mutual conſciouſneſs) which is not fully, clearly, and abundantly ſignified by that one plain Word, and known Attribute, the Divine Omniſcience.* Now ſuppoſe this; Why may not that One Comprehenſive Attribute of Omniſcience very properly receive different Names, according to its different Objects, as the ſeveral Arts and Sciences do? If, as he ſays, *by this Omniſcience every Divine Perſon knows himſelf, and the ſame Perſon, by the very ſame Omniſcience knows all that is known by the other Two Perſons, and the other Two Perſons by the ſame knows all that is known by him*; yet to know himſelf and to know whatever others know, though it may belong to the ſame Omniſcience is not the ſame Knowledge, becauſe it has not the ſame Object; for *Self* and *Others*, are as diſtinct Objects as Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are diſtinct Perſons; and therefore this Knowledge may be diſtinguiſhed by different Names, as it is by different Objects.

And

And since, as he confesses, the general Notion of Omniscience does not distinguish Persons as Self-consciousness does, nor Unite them into One, as Mutual-consciousness does, these Terms were necessary to express something, which Omniscience does not express, *viz.* wherein these Divine Persons are distinguished, and wherein they are One.

But, after all, this is a Mistake; for though *Self-consciousness* and *Mutual consciousness* may in some Sence be called Knowledge, yet they are of a different Kind and Species from what we strictly call Knowledge, that is, they differ as Speculation and Sensation. *Self-Knowledge* properly signifies to contemplate our own Natures in their Idea, to draw our own Image and Picture as like the Original as we can, and to view our selves in it: But *Self-consciousness* is an *intellectual Self-Sensation*, when we feel our selves, and all the Thoughts, Knowledge, Volitions, Passions of our Minds, and know what is Self, and what belongs to Self by feeling it: He, who knows not the difference between intellectual Sence and Knowledge, is as unfit to meddle in this Controversie, as a Blind-Man is to dispute of Colours. Thus the *Mutual-consciousness* of Three Persons is not their mutual Knowledge of each other, though they know each other as perfectly as they know themselves, but their Mutual-Sensation and feeling each other in themselves, which makes them naturally One. An omniscient Being knows all things, but feels himself; and Omniscience, as the Animadverter observes, belongs to Nature, but Mutual-consciousness to Persons, which might have satisfied him, That there is a great difference between *Omniscience*, and *Self-consciousness*, and *Mutual-consciousness*;

ſciouſneſs; between knowing all things, whether the Object be Self, or any other Being, and feeling himſelf and other Perſons in himſelf.

This is ſufficient to juſtifie the Dean's Notion of *Self-conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*, and a little more fully to explain it, which, it ſeems, he thought, that every one, who was acquainted with the workings of his own Mind, muſt have underſtood without a Comment: And, I hope, if the Animadverter think fit to try his skill again, we ſhall hear no more of his *formal Reaſons of Perſonality and Union*, but that he will be pleaſed to ſpeak to the true point, whether a Self-conſcious Perſon be not one with himſelf, and diſtinguiſhed from all other Perſons, and whether he does not feel himſelf to be thus One, and thus diſtinguiſhed by *Self-conſciouſneſs*; and whether Three Divine Perſons, who are thus Mutually-conſcious to each other, be not naturally and eſſentially United into One Supream Being, or One God. All other Diſputes are beſide the Queſtion; for if this hold true, then we have a natural Diſtinction, and a natural Unity between theſe Three Divine Perſons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; and that is a natural Trinity in Unity, without the leaſt appearance of Abſurdity or Contradiction, or impoſſibility in its Notion.

Hitherto, though the Aſſault has been furious and inſulting, we have met with no heavier Charge, (excepting ſome uſual Complements) than Ignorance in Philoſophy and Metaphyſicks, and Scholaſtick Terms, and where that Charge falls, I will now leave you to judge; but this is but the beginning of Sorrow: *Tritheiſm* follows next, which is a terrible Accuſation, though I do heartily thank the Animadverter, that

that he has been ſo civil to the Dean, as not to charge this upon him, as his Opinion, but as the conſequence of his Principles, which I believe will prove no more than the Animadverter's Ignorance, not the Dean's Hereſie. Anim. *Chap.* 5. p. 118.

Before I Anſwer his Arguments, it will be neceſſary briefly to ſtate this Matter in Controverſie; for the Sting of all his Arguments conſiſts in forcing ſuch a Sence on the Dean's Words, as he never intended.

The only thing that needs any Excuſe or Apology is the Phraſe of *Three eternal and infinite Minds*; the Fault of which is, That it is an unuſual way of Speaking, and gives advantage to an ignorant or cavilling Adverſary to affix ſome uncouth and Heretical Sence on it. What led the Dean to this, I obſerved before, *viz.* His explication of the diſtinction of the Three Divine Perſons by *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and of their eſſential Unity by *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*; now ſince *Self-conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* can be in nothing but Minds, he thought the faireſt and eaſieſt repreſentation of this Matter, was to conſider them under the Notion and Character of Minds; for every Man can feel in himſelf, that a Mind is diſtinguiſhed from all other Minds by *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and if there may be, and is, ſuch a *Mutual-conſciouſneſs* between Three, as the Dean deſcribes, they muſt be as naturally and eſſentially One, as Three can be One, and we muſt ſeek for no other *Unity in Trinity*, than what is reconcilable with a real Trinity, or a real diſtinction between Three.

But had the Dean been aware, what kind of Men he ſhould have had to do with, ſuch as have no regard to the plain and manifeſt Sence of an Author, if

if they can but pick a Quarrel with his words, he might eaſily have prevented all this, without having injured his main Argument: If inſtead of *Three eternal and infinite Minds*, he had but ſaid, *Three eternal, infinite, knowing, intelligent Perſons*, he had kept the Orthodox Language, and yet expreſſed all that he intended by *Three Minds*; for a knowing intelligent Perſon is a Mind, if Knowledge can be only in a Mind; and then Three ſuch intelligent Perſons may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and united in One Godhead by *Mutual-conſciouſneſs*. This is the Account the Dean himſelf gives, what he means by a Mind, *That a Mind is an intelligent Perſon, and that every intelligent Perſon is a Mind*, and therefore thought it as innocent in this Sence, to ſay, That there are Three eternal and infinite Minds, as to ſay, That there are Three eternal and infinite Perſons; and I believe it will appear, That excepting the unuſualneſs of the Expreſſion, the objection of *Tritheiſm* will equally lie againſt both, with this difference, That it is more eaſily Anſwered by conſidering the Powers and Properties of a Mind. And in this Sence only he affirms, That *to ſay, they are Three Perſons, and not Three diſtinct infinite Minds*, that is, not Three diſtinct intelligent Perſons, *is both Hereſie and Nonſence*; it is Nonſence to Talk of a *Perſon*, who is not an *intelligent Perſon*, that is, as he explains it, a *Mind*, which contradicts the Notion both of a Perſon and Mind; and to ſay, That there are Three Perſons, but not Three intelligent Perſons, is Hereſie, even the Hereſie of *Sabellius*; for there is no Medium between a Trinity of intelligent Perſons, and a Trinity of Names; for Powers and Faculties, and Modes, will prove no more,

Vindic. p. 66.

more, when distinguished from *intelligent Persons*: And it is evident, That this is all he intended by it, by the opposition he makes between Three Minds and Three intelligent Persons, and *Three Powers and Faculties of the same Being*; *for Faculties are not Persons, no more than Memory, Will, and Understanding, are Three Persons in One Man*: And he proves, That the received Catholick *Notion of a Person is such a Being as has Understanding, and Will, and Power of Action*, from the Arguments universally urged against the *Socinians*, to prove the Holy Ghost to be a Person, and not meerly *a Divine Power, because all the Properties of a Person belong to him, such as Understanding, Will, Affections and Actions.* So that the Dean does not charge those with *Heresie and Nonsence*, who barely refuse to use these Terms of *Three eternal and infinite Minds*, which, it may be, no body ever so expresly used before him, and which he will not contend about; but the *Heresie and Nonsence* is to assert Three distinct Divine Persons, who are not *Three distinct, eternal, infinite, intelligent Persons*, and he has Authority and Reason enough to call this both *Heresie* and *Nonsence.*

This is a sufficient Answer to that Charge the Animadverter draws up against the Dean, That he calls the Three Divine Persons *Three eternal and infinite Minds*, by which he understands no more than Three *intelligent Persons*; and if He thinks an *intelligent Person* to be a *Mind*, let the Animadverter confute him, if he can; and if he means no more by *Three Minds* than *Three intelligent Persons*, (as it is evident he could mean no more) how inconvenient soever this expression may be thought, let the

Animadverter try his Skill to make *Tritheism* of *Three Minds*, and excuse *Three intelligent Persons* from the same Charge. And now let us consider his Arguments, which he shews with great Pomp in Mode and Figure.

Pag. 119. Arg. 1. *Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits, are Three distinct Gods. But the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Gods. And therefore the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are not Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits.*

Now let us but change the Term of *Minds* into *Intelligent Persons*, and it is the very Argument the *Socinians* urge to confute the Doctrine of Three Divine Persons, or to charge it with *Tritheism*, and runs thus: *Three distinct, infinite, intelligent Persons, are Three distinct Gods. But there are not Three distinct Gods. And therefore there are not Three distinct, infinite, intelligent Persons in the Godhead*; and consequently to assert Three such distinct Persons is to assert Three Gods.

His proof of the Major Proposition will serve as well for an eternal, infinite, intelligent Person, as for an eternal infinite Mind. *For God and eternal, infinite, intelligent Person, are Terms as equipollent and convertible, as God and infinite Mind or Spirit. God being it truly and properly* an infinite, intelligent Person, as *an infinite Mind or Spirit*, and an infinite, intelligent Person being as *truly and properly* God, as *an infinite Mind.*

If the Animadverter think fit to Answer, That *One* God, and *One* infinite Mind are *convertible Terms*, but *One* God, and *One* infinite, intelligent Person are not *convertible Terms*, because there are Three such infinite Persons in the Godhead, and but One infinite Mind;

the reply is eaſie, That the bare *Terms*, from which he argues, do not prove this diſtinction; For though in the Doctrine of the Trinity, cuſtom has more reconciled us to the Term *Perſon* than *Mind*; yet, ſetting aſide this Diſpute, all Mankind underſtand the ſame thing by an *infinite Mind*, and an *infinite intelligent Perſon*; it is plain the *Socinians* do, and hence conclude, That there is but *One Perſon* in the Godhead, becauſe God is but One *infinite Mind*. Whether there be One or Three infinite Minds, or infinite intelligent Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead, is a Diſpute of a higher Nature, and can't be determined by *Convertible Terms*; for though the ancient Philoſophers and Poets (as he Learnedly proves, what every School-Boy knows) did acknowledge God to be a *Mind* or *Spirit*, that is, an underſtanding, intelligent, immaterial Being, yet moſt of them by Mind underſtood no more than One ſingle Mind, or One ſingle Intelligent Perſon, and he might have known, that *Plato*, to whom he appeals, though he acknowledged God to be a Mind, yet he owned Three ſuch Minds in the Unity of the Godhead. And therefore could not think, That *One God*, and *One infinite Mind*, were equipollent and convertible Terms; becauſe he aſſerted Three infinite Minds to be but One God.

But ſince the Animadverter has only made *God*, and *infinite Mind or Spirit*, *equipollent and convertible Terms*, we may allow him this, and ſtill deny his Major Propoſition, that therefore *Three diſtinct infinite Minds or Spirits*, *are Three diſtinct Gods*; for though God is an infinite Mind, and an infinite Mind is God, it does not follow that *Three infinite Minds are Three diſtinct Gods*, no more than Three

infinite intelligent Perſons are Three diſtinct Gods; but only as it is expreſſed in the *Athanaſian* Creed, That *we are compelled by the Chriſtian Verity to acknowledge every Perſon by himſelf* (μοναδικῶς, ſingly, diſtinctly) *to be God and Lord, and yet are forbidden by the Catholick Religion to ſay, there be Three Gods or Three Lords.* If God be an infinite Mind, and there be Three infinite Minds, it muſt follow, That each of theſe Three infinite Minds, *diſtinctly*, and *by himſelf* conſidered, is God, not that theſe Three are Three diſtinct Gods, but One God.

Indeed the Animadverter's Argument from *Convertibility and Commenſuration, that whatſoever may be affirmed or denied of the One, may with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed and denied of the other,* proves all that the Dean would deſire, *viz.* that every diſtinct Perſon in the Godhead is diſtinctly *by himſelf* an infinite Mind, becauſe he is diſtinctly *by himſelf* God, and God is *infinite Mind*, and therefore every Perſon, who is God, is infinite Mind; for no Perſon can, *by himſelf* be God, who has not *by himſelf* all the Perfections that belong to the Idea of God: So that here are Three Perſons in the Godhead, each of which *by himſelf* is *infinite Mind.* And therefore, though it may be improper, in an abſolute Sence to ſay, there are Three eternal and infinite Minds, when we acknowledge this *infinite Mind* is, and eternally was eſſentially and inſeparably *One*; yet we muſt ſay, that this One infinite Mind is eſſentially diſtinguiſhed into Three infinite intelligent Perſons, whom, in any other caſe, we ſhould call Three Minds, and are as much Three as is conſiſtent with the eſſential Unity of the Godhead; and this is reaſon enough to conſider the diſtinction

ſtinction of Perſons, and the Unity of the Godhead, as we would the Diſtinction and Unity of Three Minds; and then this One eternal infinite Mind, may be diſtinguiſhed into Three intelligent Perſons, by Three Self-conſciouſneſſes, and be eſſentially One by a natural Mutual-conſciouſneſs, which is all the Dean intended, or had occaſion to aſſert. And if this be all he means by the *Godhead*, and *infinite Mind*, which is common to all Three Perſons, the Dean readily agrees with him, and in this Sence will no more ſay, that there are *Three infinite Minds*, than that there are *Three Gods*.

The Animadverter was aware of this, That the ſame Objection *of Three Gods*, would as well lie againſt Three Perſons as againſt Three Minds; and let us conſider how he avoids the blow. The difference he makes between them is this, That *Three infinite Minds or Spirits are Three abſolute, ſimple Beings, or Eſſences, and ſo ſtand diſtinguiſhed from one another by their whole Beings or Natures.* The Sum of which is no more but this, That Three diſtinct Minds are Three diſtinct Gods, becauſe they *are diſtinguiſhed*; but if notwithſtanding their diſtinction, they are eſſentially and inſeparably One, they are not Three diſtinct Gods, but a real Trinity of Divine Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead, which all Men muſt own, who believe a Trinity in Unity. But are not *Three infinite intelligent Perſons*, as much *Three abſolute, ſimple Beings and Eſſences*, as Three Minds? No! by no means! *The Divine Perſons are Three Relatives, (or One ſimple Being or Eſſence under Three diſtinct Relations) and conſequently differ from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in them, but only by ſome Mode or Reſpect peculiar to each, and upon that account cauſing their Deſtinction.*

ſtinction. This is perfect Gibberiſh, which I am certain he underſtands not one Word of himſelf; But let us examine it.

The Divine Perſons, he ſays, *are Three Relatives*; very right; for *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*, are Three, and are related to each other. But what are *Three Relatives*? that comes in by way of Parentheſis, *One ſimple Being, or Eſſence under Three diſtinct Relations.* That theſe Three Perſons, thus related to each other, are *One ſimple Being, or Eſſence* we readily grant, for they were from eternity inſeparably united in One infinite Eſſence, or One Supream God; but the Queſtion ſtill remains, what theſe Three Perſons are, into which this One Being, or Eſſence, is diſtinguiſhed by theſe Three diſtinct Relations? *Three Relatives* are not Three Relations, but Three things related to each other; What then, are theſe Three Perſons in the Unity of the Divine Eſſence? *Three Relations, Three Modes, Three Reſpects*, without ſome Being, which tho' eſſentially One, is really and ſubſtantially Three, is Nonſence in Logick; for there muſt be as many real, ſubſtantial Relatives and Correlates, as there are Relations, unleſs the Relation between Father and Son can ſubſiſt without a real Father and Son. The Perſon then of the Father, the Perſon of the Son, and the Perſon of the Holy Ghoſt, are not the Relations between Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, but real, ſubſtantial Perſons, thus related to each other: And if theſe are Three intelligent Perſons, let him make, if he can, Three Gods of Three Minds, and excuſe *Three real intelligent Perſons* from the ſame Charge. But the Truth is, to prevent the Charge of making Three Gods, he diſtinguiſhes the Three Divine Perſons, into Three Logical Relations,

or

or Modes of Subſiſtence; and if we will be contented with a Trinity of Modes, he is for us; but this looks very like renouncing a Trinity of Perſons, to ſecure the Unity of the Godhead; and I fear will prove no better when thoroughly examined.

In what Sence the Three Divine Perſons are *Three Relatives*, or *Three Relations*, I have explained above; their Nature is compleat and abſolute, if the Divine Nature be ſo, but their Subſiſtence is Relative, as it muſt of Neceſſity be, when the ſame individual Nature is repeated, and ſubſiſts diſtinctly in Three, If it be eſſential to the Father to be a Father, he ſubſiſts with a neceſſary Relation to his Son; if it be eſſential to the Son to be a Son, the perfect living Image of the Father, his Subſiſtence is wholly Relative, as the Subſiſtence of an Image is, which depends upon the Prototype. And therefore though each Divine Perſon be eternal and infinite Mind, and with reſpect to their Three real Subſiſtences, may be called Three infinite eternal Minds, (as the Dean ventured to call them) yet theſe Three are not *Three abſolute ſimple Beings or Eſſences, which ſtand diſtinguiſhed from one another by their whole Beings or Natures*, but One abſolute eternal Mind repeated in Three Relative Subſiſtences without multiplication: As a Man and his living Image, though each of them have diſtinctly Humane Nature, and upon that account might be called Two Men, yet they have but One compleat, abſolute Humane Nature, though it be repeated in the Image, and are but One Man in Two Perſons, or Two Humane Subſiſtences.

Had the Dean indeed made Three compleat, abſolute, eternal Minds, he had been juſtly chargeable with making Three Gods, but the ſame eternal and infinite

infinite Mind repeated in Three Subſiſtences, neceſſarily and eſſentially related to each other, are but One eternal God.

2. His ſecond Argument is this.

Three diſtinct Minds or Spirits, are Three diſtinct Subſtances.

But the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity, are not Three diſtinct Subſtances.

And therefore they are not Three diſtinct Minds or Spirits.

The Dean does not pretend to know any thing of the Subſtance of a Mind, much leſs of God, who is an infinite Mind: He is contented to know, That a Mind is a thinking and underſtanding Being; and though Underſtanding, and Being, and Nature, or Subſtance, may be diſtinguiſhed in finite, created Minds, yet St. *Auſtin* has taught him, that in God, * *to be is not One thing, and to underſtand another, or whatever elſe* can be ſaid of the *Divine Nature*, and therefore not *Subſtance* neither. So that if in the Unity of the Godhead there be but Three ſuch diſtinct Underſtandings, or Minds or intelligent Perſons, who are not each other, and do not underſtand by each other, but diſtinctly by themſelves, as St. *Auſtin* expreſly obſerves, † *That no man will ſay, That the Father does not underſtand by himſelf, but by his Son*, he is not concerned about *diſtinct Subſtances*, which are the ſame with *to be*, and *to underſtand* in God.

* Ideo ipſa mirabilis ſimplicitas commendatur quia non ibi, (in Trinitate) aliud eſt eſſe, aliud intelligere, vel ſiquid aliud de dei natura dicitur. Anima verò quia eſt, etiam dum non intelligit, aliud eſt quidem eſſe, aliud eſt quod intelligit. *Aug. Evod. Ep.* 102.

Proinde in unum Deum Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum credamus, ita ut nec filius credatur eſſe qui pater eſt, nec pater qui filius eſt, nec pater nec filius, qui utriuſq; ſpiritus eſt —— Sed hæc tria æqualia eſſe, & coæterna, & omnino eſſe una natura. *Ibid.*

† Deinde quis audeat dicere patrem non intelligere per ſemetipſum, ſed per filium? *Ibid.*

But

But his Proofs of both Propositions are entertaining. His Major, That *Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances*, he proves from *the Definition of a Mind or Spirit, that it is* Substantia incorporea intelligens; *an intelligent, incorporeal (or immaterial) Substance*; and therefore *Three distinct Minds or Spirits must be Three such distinct Substances*. Now if a Man should deny his Definition, and say, That a Mind is *res cogitans*, a thinking Being, he would be undone for want of his *Substances*; but I shall only cap Definitions with him at present, That a Person is *Substantia individua naturæ rationabilis, the individual Substance of a Rational Nature*: And therefore if there be Three distinct Persons, there are Three such distinct Substances in the Godhead, and let us see how he will bring off Three Persons from being Three distinct Substances, and I will undertake the Dean shall do as much, and do it as well, for Three Minds.

But if a Mind were not a Substance, what could it be else? Let us know first, what Substance is, and then we'll tell him. Not *quod substat accidentibus* I hope, for then he immediately proves, That God is no Substance, because *no accident can be in God*, nor need he fear, that the Dean will make a *Mind* a *Mode of Subsistence* in his Sence of it, but a true and real Mind, which does really and actually subsist, though these Three eternal Minds are but Three eternal Subsistences of the same One individual eternal Mind.

As for the Minor, viz. *That the Three Divine Persons in the blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances*, he proves first *from Authority*; and he is as dangerous a Man at Authorities, as ever I met with. He cites *Tertullian*, St. *Jerom*, St. *Austin*, and some others, and he might have produced the Authority of all

Pag. 123.

all the ancient Fathers, to prove, that there is but *One Subſtance in God*; but this is nothing to his purpoſe, for by *One Subſtance* they plainly meant the *Homoouſion*, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, were of the ſame Nature, and by denying *Three Subſtances*, they principally rejected Three divers Natures, of different Kinds and Species, in oppoſition to Arianiſm, which denied the Son to be of the ſame Nature with his Father; this he might have learnt from what he cites from his Orthodox Father, *Bellarmine*, *That to aſſert, that the Father and the Son differ in Subſtance is Arianiſm*; for the difference the Arians made, and the Catholicks oppoſed, was not in the real diſtinction of their Perſons, but in the diverſity of their Natures; and the Reaſon he adds, will not help it out: *And yet* (he adds) *if they were Two diſtinct Subſtances, for them not to differ in Subſtance would be impoſſible*; as if to be diſtinct, and to differ in Subſtance were the ſame thing: As if Two Men were not *unius Subſtantiæ*, of one and the ſame Subſtance, as St. *Auſtin* and all the Fathers aſſert, becauſe they are Two diſtinct Men, and each of them has a diſtinct Nature of his own? Or if he will call this a Difference, as if to differ in number and in Subſtance or Nature were the ſame thing? or as if to differ in number proved a diverſity of Nature too. It is a tedious thing to diſpute with Men, who muſt be taught to conſtrue the Fathers, and to underſtand common Sence.

But if Authority will not do this, he is reſolved Reaſon ſhall, and he has as peculiar a Talent at Reaſon as he has at Authorities. He proves, That the *Three Perſons* can't be Three diſtinct Minds, becauſe they are not *Three diſtinct Subſtances*. Now the Dean may very ſafely deny this Conſequence, and try how

the

the Animadverter will prove it; That if Three Minds are Three intelligent Perſons, and a Mind is a Subſtance, therefore *Three diſtinct Minds, or Perſons*, are *Three diſtinct Subſtances*; for Three diſtinct Minds may ſubſiſt diſtinctly, and yet inſeparably in One Eternal and infinite Subſtance, as Three intelligent Perſons do. Though the true and ſhort Anſwer is, That the ſame Subſtance repeated in Three diſtinct Subſiſtences, is not Three Subſtances, but One, as I have often obſerved in the Caſe of the Man and his Image.

But ſuppoſe *Three Perſons were Three diſtinct Subſtances*, inſeparably united in One: What then? What then? It is a Terrible then: *For then Two Subſtances will concur in, and belong to each Perſon; to wit that Subſtance, which is the Divine Eſſence, and ſo is communicable or common to all the Perſons, and the Subſtance, which conſtitutes each Perſon, and thereby is ſo peculiar to him, as to diſtinguiſh him from the other, and conſequently to be incommunicable to any beſides him, to whom it belongs.*

I am heartily aſhamed and ſorry to ſee ſuch Stuff, as muſt neceſſarily expoſe our Holy Faith to the ſcorn of Atheiſts and Infidels, and that I may not contribute to it, all this Nonſence ſhall eſcape the laſh of my Pen. In ſhort, the Dean knows no Divine Subſtance or Eſſence diſtinct from the Three Divine Perſons, nor knows any diſtinction between the Divine Eſſence, and a Divine Perſon, but that the Eſſence makes the Perſon. That the whole Divine Eſſence or Nature is originally in God the Father, that this ſame whole Divine Nature and Eſſence was by eternal Generation, communicated by the Father to the Son, and ſubſiſts diſtinctly in him; That this ſame

whole Divine Nature by eternal Procession, is communicated by the Father and the Son, to the Holy Ghost, and subsists distinctly in him; and these Three Divine Persons by an inseparable Union, dwelling in each other, is that Supream and Sovereign Being, who is the One God, or a Trinity in Unity.

It is amazing to think what strange Conceits this Man must have of a Trinity of Persons, and Unity of Essence or Substance: For I am sure no Man has any Idea of an intelligent Nature and Essence distinguished from a Person, or of Persons distinguished from a rational Nature; of a Divine Essence and Substance, which is no Person; and of Divine Persons, which are no Substances, as it seems, they cannot be in the Animadverter's way, unless he also will compound every Person of Two Substances. What is the Divine Essence and Substance, but an infinite and eternal Mind? And is not an infinite and eternal Mind a Person? The Divine Essence then must be acknowledged to be a Person, and to be a substantial Person, or the Divine Substance; so that there is a Person, that is a Substance, and if there be but One such single and solitary Divine Essence, there can be but One such single and solitary Person: Will he then make four Persons in the Godhead; the Divine Essence, which is a substantial Person, and Three Persons, which are no Substances? Or will he own God to be, what *Pascentius* objected to St. *Austin*, and he rejected with Scorn; *Triformis Persona*, One Divine Person under Three Forms: this or something more Senceless is the Truth of the Case, as may appear more hereafter; but I will now proceed.

Ep. 176, 177.

3. His third Argument is this.

If it be truly said, that one and the same infinite Mind

Mind or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt (I mean all Three taken together) and it cannot be truly ſaid, that one and the ſame infinite Mind or Spirit is Three diſtinct infinite Minds or Spirits, then it follows, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are not Three diſtinct infinite Minds or Spirits.

This Logick is a very troubleſome thing, when Men want Sence. The whole of this Argument is this, That One infinite Mind can't be Three infinite Minds, nor Three infinite Minds One infinite Mind, and that Three Perſons, who are One infinite Mind, can't be Three infinite Minds; that is, That Three can't be One, nor One Three; which if it be univerſally true, there is an end of a Trinity in Unity; if it be not univerſally true, that is, if Three may be One, and One Three, the meer oppoſition between Three and One, which is the whole force of his Argument, is childiſh Sophiſtry: For if they be Three and One in different Reſpects, this is no Contradiction. Every Divine Perſon is an infinite Mind, and as diſtinctly ſo, as he is a diſtinct Perſon, and yet by their eſſential and inſeparable Union to each other, all Three are but One eternal infinite Mind, as they are but One God. But when theſe Three Divine Perſons, are ſaid to be Three, and to be One eternal and infinite Mind, they are Three and One Mind upon different Reſpects; every Perſon by himſelf, as a diſtinct Perſon, is an eternal infinite Mind, that is, is a knowing intelligent Being, and has all the Perfections of an infinite Underſtanding, diſtinguiſhed from the other Perſons by *Self-conſciouſneſs*; and all Three Perſons by their inſeparable Union to each other, are but One eternal infinite Mind, as having each other in themſelves by *Mutual conſciouſneſs*; and let the Animadverter

verter ſhew where the Contradiction is, That there ſhould be *Three Self-conſcious infinite Minds*, as there are Three infinite Perſons, united into One mutual-conſcious Mind, as Three diſtinct Perſons are united in the Unity of the Godhead: eſpecially when this One eternal Mind is entirely and perfectly repeated without the leaſt change in Three eternal intelligent Subſiſtences; each of which is diſtinctly an eternal Mind, but the ſame One individual eternal Mind.

4. His fourth and laſt Argument is this:

Whatſoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Perſons in the Athanaſian *Form, ſo belongs to them all in common, that it can belong to none of them under any Term of diſtinction from the reſt.*

But the attribute (infinite Mind or Spirit) may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Perſons in and according to the Athanaſian *Form.*

And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of diſtinction from the reſt.

This is a wonderful Argument, if it be well conſidered. For,

1. *Infinite Mind or Spirit* is no *Attribute*, but the Divine Nature and Eſſence it ſelf, and our Metaphyſical Animadverter uſes to diſtinguiſh between Eſſence and Attributes in God; and diſputes earneſtly without an opponent, that infinite Mind is God; and therefore, That there is but One infinite Mind, as there is but One God; Is God himſelf then an Attribute? What will he make of God at laſt, when the Divine Eſſence is an Attribute, and a Divine Perſon a meer Mode?

2. But let *infinite Mind or Spirit* be an Attribute or the Divine Eſſence, ſince *it may be truly predicated*

of

of all and each of the Divine Perſons, it muſt ſo belong to them all in common, that it can belong to none of them under any Term of diſtinction from the reſt. If by this *Term of diſtinction from the reſt*, he means it cannot belong to each of them conſidered *diſtinctly* as ſuch *diſtinct Perſons*, then it cannot *be predicated diſtinctly of them neither*; for nothing can, without manifeſt abſurdity, be diſtinctly predicated of Three diſtinct Perſons, if it do not diſtinctly belong to each of them: If the Father, conſidered as the Father, and as a diſtinct Perſon from the Son, and from the Holy Ghoſt, be not an infinite Mind, it cannot be truly ſaid, That the Father is an infinite Mind; and if the Son, as a diſtinct Perſon from the Father and the Holy Ghoſt is not an infinite Mind, it cannot be truly affirmed diſtinctly of the Son, that he is an infinite Mind. Predication, if it be true, muſt follow Nature, and therefore nothing can be particularly and diſtinctly predicated of any Perſon, which does not diſtinctly belong to him. What is common to Three, cannot be ſo peculiarly appropriated to any One, as to exclude either of the other Two; for it is not common, if it be not common to all; and no more is it common, if each of them have it not as diſtinctly as they ſubſiſt: For diſtinct Perſons, that ſubſiſt diſtinctly, muſt diſtinctly have what they have, or they cannot have it at all; though Humane Nature is common to all Mankind, yet every diſtinct Man, diſtinctly enjoys Humane Nature; for there is no other way of diſtinction of Perſons in a common Nature: There is indeed a great difference between the diſtinction of Humane Perſons, and of the Divine Perſons in the Sacred Trinity, and between the Divine Nature, being common to all Three Divine Per-

Perſons, and Humane Nature, being common to all Mankind, as I have often obſerved; but there is ſo much likeneſs and Analogy between them, as to make it very abſurd to ſay, That what is common to Three diſtinct Perſons, does not belong diſtinctly to each.

3. Nor does *the form of the* Athanaſian *Creed* forbid us diſtinctly to attribute to each diſtinct Perſon of the Trinity, what is common to all Three; for the Creed it ſelf does this expreſly in every point; *The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, the Holy Ghoſt uncreate. The Father Incomprehenſible, Eternal, Almighty, God and Lord; and the Son Incomprehenſible, Eternal, Almighty, God and Lord; and the Holy Ghoſt Incomprehenſible, Eternal, Almighty, God and Lord.* And that *the Chriſtian Verity compels us to acknowledge every Perſon by himſelf* (μεταδικῶς, which, I think, is *diſtinctly*) *God and Lord.*

Well! but the *Creed* expreſly denies, That therefore there are *Three Uncreate*, or *Three Incomprehenſibles*, or *Three Eternals*, or *Three Almighties*, or *Three Gods*, or *Three Lords:* I grant it, but not for the Animadverter's Reaſon, becauſe what is common to all Three, does not diſtinctly belong to each, or to all of them, for the Creed expreſly affirms, that it does; but becauſe theſe Three Divine Perſons, each of which have *diſtinctly* all theſe Perfections of the Divine Nature, and the whole Divine Nature in them are ſo inſeparably united, as to be eſſentially One: And therefore, though there are Three Eternal, Incomprehenſible, Almighty Perſons, each of which is God and Lord, yet there is but One Eternal, Incomprehenſible, Almighty God and Lord; and thus it muſt be, if we will maintain with the *Athanaſian* Creed,

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the real distinction of Persons, and the Unity of the Godhead: If there be *Three Persons*, each of which is *by himself, Uncreate, Eternal, Incomprehensible, Almighty*, I will venture any Man, who can understand plain Sence, and dares own it, to deny, if he can, That there are *Three* Uncreate, Eternal, Incomprehensible, Almighty *Persons*. And in this Sence the Dean has not transgressed the Form of the *Athanasian* Creed, by *Three infinite Minds*, if we understand them of Three infinite, intelligent, Persons; and it is certain he could understand nothing else by them, when he unites these Three infinite Minds into One infinite Mind, which can signifie nothing else but *Three Persons and One God*.

This is enough in Answer to the Animadverter's Arguments, and I believe you are sensible by this time, what a profound Reasoner he is; in the next place we should consider his Authorities, but I am very weary of this work, and I guess, you think it a pretty long Letter already, but if you desire it, and will have a little Patience, neither you nor the Animadverter shall long complain for want of an Answer, though I can't but think it a needless undertaking; for no Man, who ever lookt into the Fathers, can want an Answer, and those who cannot consult the Fathers themselves, will believe as their Inclinations and Affections lead them: I will undertake, the Fathers shall absolve the Dean from the Imputation of Tritheism, let the Animadverter fence as well as he can against *Sabellianism*. His *Socinian* Friends and Admirers declare, they will not dispute with him about a Trinity of meer Modes and Postures in the Singularity of the Divine Essence; for though they have too much Sence to own

and profeſs ſuch a Trinity, yet they think it not worth diſputing: It is a real, ſubſtantial, ſubſiſting Trinity they are afraid of, and diſpute againſt; ſuch a Trinity the Dean aſſerts, and has vindicated from Abſurdity and Contradiction, and this is the Trinity, which both the Scripture Teaches, and the ancient Catholick Church always taught; and this I undertake to prove.

There is indeed a third part of the Animadverſions, if that may be called a part, which runs through and inſpires the whole, in which the Animadverter is by much an Over-match for any Man who is a Chriſtian; I mean his ſcolding part, for it would Prophane the Name of Wit to give it that Title. This I don't pretend to Anſwer, and you your ſelf confeſs it ſhould be deſpiſed, not Anſwered: Let him then here ſecurely Triumph, and receive the Reward of ſuch Heroical Actions; *Ut pueris placeas, & declamatio fias.*

And therefore I ſhall only add, That if you want an Anſwer to the Preface, you ſhould read the Dean's *Defence of the Knowledge of Jeſus Chriſt and our Union and Communion with him*, which was publiſhed many Years ſince, and ſilenced all his Adverſaries then, that he heard no more of that till the Animadverter revived the Quarrel, who could have given you the Dean's Anſwers to his own Objections, if he had ſo pleaſed; for they are not new, but borrowed from ſuch Wits as Mr. *Alſop*, without any new ſtrength given to them.

Where the Animadverter charges the Dean with Abſurdities and Contradictions, turn to the place, and read it with its context, and tell me what you can't Anſwer, and I will.

But

But if you, or any body else, can be perswaded by the Animadverter, That the Dean understands neither *English*, *Latin*, nor *Greek*; neither *Logicks*, *Metaphysicks*, or *Common Sence*; I need wish you no other Punishment, than when ever you Write to fall into the hands of such an Adversary; for, I believe, there are very few Writers, but might be exposed in the same manner by a spiteful Critick, not the Animadverter himself excepted, who begins his Animadversions with a notorious Blunder in deriving *a Mystery* from μυέω, or μύω; whereas *a Mystery* does not signifie in *English* the word *Mystery*, but the thing signified by that word; and therefore, though *the word Mystery* may be derived, *a Mystery* is derived from no Word; and to Talk of deriving *a Mystery* is neither *English* nor Sence.

But though it were Justice to return some of his Complements to the Dean upon himself, yet his Example is too scandalous to be imitated, and there is no need to expose him, more than his own Pen has done. I am,

SIR,

Your very Faithful Friend.

A POST-SCRIPT,

Concerning the Calm-Diſcourſe of the Trinity in the Godhead.

SIR,

SInce my writing this Letter, I have met with a Book, Entituled, *A Calm and Sober Enquiry concerning the poſſibility of a Trinity in the Godhead*, Written, as is ſaid, by a Man of great Reputation among the Diſſenters: I do not intend to examine the Book, nor to approve, or diſapprove it, though there ſeem to be very obnoxious Paſſages in it, ſhould he fall into ſuch hands as our Animadverter: He has taken great care, That no Man ſhould ſuſpect that he favours the Dean in his Notions; and I believe, the Dean will thank him for that, for if I underſtand him, he would never have ſaid, and would be as unwilling that any Man ſhould think he has ſaid, what the Enquirer has.

But all I deſign by this *Poſt-ſcript*, is only this, to let you ſee, that though the Enquirer does not in every particular ſay what the Dean ſays, yet he ſays what will juſtifie the Dean againſt the heavieſt Charge the Animadverter himſelf could frame againſt his Hypotheſis, and that is *Tritheiſm*.

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The pretence of this is, what the Dean says concerning Three *distinct, eternal, infinite Minds*, and the Objections and Answers you have already heard; and if I can understand the Enquirer, he says this as plainly, and in more obnoxious Terms than the Dean has done.

To prove the possibility of *a Trinity in the Godhead*, he argues from the possibility of God's uniting *two Spirits* by as close an Union, as he has united *Spirit and Body* which make One Man; *and if it were possible to him* (God) *to unite Two, would it not be as possible to unite Three*: So that he represents the Trinity in Unity, by the Union of Three Spirits; *which are distinguished by their own individual Essences, and remain distinct by their singular Essences; so as to be everlastingly united, but not Identified, and by Vertue of that Union be some one thing, as much, and as truly as our Soul and Body united do constitute One Man.* *Calm Discourse* p. 19, 20, 21.

Now from the possibility of *such an Union with such a distinction* in created Spirits, he concludes the possibility of such *an Union unmade; or that is original and eternal, in an unmade or uncreated Being*; that is, That Three eternal, unmade, uncreated Spirits may be thus united in One Godhead; that is, That there are, or may be (for whatever he thinks, which may be easily guessed at, he will not positively assert it) *Three eternal, uncreated Minds* in the Unity of the Godhead. Pag. 23.

This he proves from *the Incarnation, That the Union of the Two Natures, the Humane* (*made up of an Humane Body and Humane Soul, which are Two exceedingly different Natures*) *with the Divine* (*which is a Third, and infinitely more different from both the other*) Pag. 25.

other) in One Person, viz. of the Son of God, cannot certainly appear to any considering Person, more conceivable or possible, than that which we now suppose (but assert not) of Three distinct Essences united in the One Godhead.

And that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have their distinct Essences, he proves also from the Doctrine of the Incarnation, since *the Man Christ is confessed to be in Hypostatical Union with the uncreated Spiritual Being of God, not as that Being is in the Person of the Father, nor as in the Person of the Holy Ghost, for then they should have become Man too; but as it was in the Person of the Son only, why should it be thought less possible, That Three uncreated Spiritual Beings (which the Animadverter will no more allow of them of Three eternal Minds) may be in so near an Union with each other, as to be One God, as that a created Spirit (and Body too) should be in so near an Union with One of the Persons in the Godhead only, as therewith to be One Person? Will it not hereby be much more apprehensible, how One of the Persons (as the common way of speaking is) should be Incarnate, and not the other Two? Will not the Notion of Person it self be much more unexceptionable, when it shall be supposed to have its own individual Nature? —— Will it be Tritheism and inconsistent with the acknowledged inviolable Unity of the Godhead?*

A great deal more to this purpose you may find in his first Letter to Dr. *Wallis*, p. 100, &c. and whether this be *Tritheism* or not, he had best ask the Animadverter, who charged the Dean's Hypothesis with *Tritheism*, with much less Reason: And, I confess, I am amazed, that after all this he should so industriously Vindicate himself from Dr. *Sherlock's* Notion

Notion of *Three infinite Minds or Spirits*, for *Three distinct Substances* the Dean does not assert; and if the Enquirer has not all this while been proving, *Three Spirits, Three distinct Essences, Three individual Natures* in the Godhead, no Man living can guess what he means; for my part, I cannot tell where the difference is, unless it be in the Term of *infinite*; for his *Three Spirits*, and *Essences*, and *individual Natures*, which make up his Unity of the Godhead, as he has represented it, do not seem to be infinite. Pag. 40.

But he shelters himself from the Animadverter, whom he seems to be terribly afraid of, in Academick uncertainty, and thinks he may safely dispute as he pleases, and all on one side, so long as he *asserts* nothing; though I cannot see how the Dean was more dogmatical than the Enquirer, who proposed his Hypothesis only as a possible and intelligible Notion; every Body indeed might guess, what the Dean's private Opinion was, and so they may, what the Enquirer conceives about it, but he was far enough from imposing upon other Men, by asserting, That thus it must be, and it cannot be otherwise: He was only concerned to represent a possible and intelligible Notion; and that the Enquirer pretends to as much as he, and therefore falls under the same Condemnation: Nay, the Enquirer is much more exposed to the Charge of *Tritheism*, by asserting, *Three distinct Essences, Three individual Natures*, and *Three spiritual Beings*, than the Dean was, who never said any such thing, and the Animadverter charges him with it only by consequence, That Three Minds are Three distinct Substances and Essences, which he may deny, and I deny for him; but the Enquirer says it in express

words. The Dean allows but One Divine Essence, and One individual Nature in the Godhead, repeated in Three Persons, but without multiplication, as I have already explained it; and how to own Three Essences, and Three individual Divine Natures in the Godhead, without making Three Gods, seems to have some difficulty in it. For Three individual Natures in the Deity, seem to sound very like Three individual Natures in Humanity, which make Three Men.

But though the Enquirer has distinguished Father, Son, and Holy Ghost by *their singular Essences*, much more than the Dean has, yet he thinks he has also made a more close Union between them, and therefore is not so liable to the Charge of *Tritheism*.

Pag. 45. For as he says, reflecting upon the Dean's Notion, *An Hypothesis in this Affair, which leaves out the very Nexus, the natural and eternal Union, or leaves it out of its proper place, and insists upon Mutual-consciousness, which, at the most, is but a consequence thereof, wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the Unity of the Godhead. If Two or Three created Spirits had never so perfect a mutual Perspection of one another, that would not constitute them One thing, tho' it probably argue them to be so, and but probably.* This is all a mistake of the Dean's Notion of *Mutual-consciousness*, as I have sufficiently shown, which is not a *Mutual-perspection*, or *Mutual-insight into one another*, but a feeling each other in themselves; and if such an *internal vital Sensation* be not an essential Union, I believe no Man can tell me what it is. It is certain, the Dean took it to be so; and therefore he did not *leave out a natural, eternal Union*. Whatever the *Nexus*, as he calls it, be, if they

they are united into a Mutual-conscious Life, they are essentially One, and I am sure he can never form any Notion of the *Union of Spiritual Essences* without it.

But I have said enough of this already, and therefore shall now briefly consider, how the Enquirer unites these *Three distinct Essences, Three Spiritual Beings, Three individual Natures* in the Unity of the Godhead. And I believe the Dean will like his Unity of the Godhead, as little as his distinction.

He represents this by the Union of Soul and Body, which makes One Man; and by the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, which makes One Christ, as you see by what I have already cited: But these are Personal Unions, and therefore cannot be the Unity of the Godhead, in which is a Trinity of distinct Persons. And yet, as far as I can possibly understand him (and if I mistake him, I shall be glad for many Reasons to be better informed) no other Unity will satisfie him, but such an Union of Three Spiritual Beings, and individual Natures, as by their composition constitute the Godhead, as the composition of Soul and Body make the Man.

For this reason he disputes earnestly against the *universal, absolute, unanimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature*, and will not allow, that Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, are the same thing in God, and distinguished into different Conceptions by us, only through the Weakness of our Understandings, which cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one Thought, and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by Parts. Pag. 28, &c.

Pag. 31. This prepared his way to make *Three ſpiritual neceſſary Beings* of theſe Three Divine Attributes, *Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power*, the natural Union of which make One God, and a natural Trinity in Unity.

Pag. 34. If you object, *That that gives us the Notion of a compounded Deity, or of a compoſition in it*; he anſwers this difficulty, by giving us a new Notion of a *Compoſition*; which, he ſays, *ſeems to imply a pre-exiſting component, that brings ſuch things together, and ſuppoſes ſuch and ſuch more ſimple things to have pre-exiſted apart, or ſeparate, and to be brought afterwards together into the united State*: that is to ſay, That how many Parts ſoever any thing conſiſts of, you muſt not ſay it is a compound Being, unleſs its Parts were once aſunder, and put together by ſome other Being: That if a Man ſuppoſe, who conſiſts of Body and Soul, had been from Eternity without a Maker, and his Soul and Body had never ſubſiſted apart, he could not have been ſaid to have been a compound Creature, though he would have had the ſame Parts then that he has now, that is, Soul and Body; and therefore, though God does conſiſt of Parts, of thoſe *Three ſpiritual Beings*, and *individual Natures*, the Union of which makes the Godhead, yet he is not a *Compounded Deity*, becauſe he eternally and neceſſarily is, what he is, without a Maker; and theſe *Three ſpiritual Beings*, never did præexiſt apart, but were eternally united to each other: The ſumm of which is no more but this, That God is not a made Compound, but an eternal unmade Compound; but a Compound he is, as a Compound ſignifies a Being, which conſiſts of diſtinct Parts, united to each other.

But I always thought, That the whole Christian World, who have always denied any Parts or Composition in God, did not by this mean, that he was not made, but that he had no Parts; and one principal Argument against all Parts and Composition in God, is, That he is eternal and unmade, and whatever has Parts must have a Maker.

There can be but One eternal Nature, and yet if there be Three eternal Parts of the Deity, there must be Three eternal Natures, not only distinct, but different Natures, or else they could not be Parts in the Composition, for they would be the same. Three Spiritual Beings, One of which is Goodness, another Wisdom, and a third Power, are Three different eternal Natures, how closely soever they are united; for, as he argues, Goodness is not Wisdom, nor Wisdom Power, nor Power Wisdom or Goodness, and Three different eternal Natures is a new Notion among Christians.

And though we have a natural Notion of an eternal Being, we have no Notion of an eternal Union of eternal Parts, or of Three eternal Parts in the Deity, which necessarily coexist in an eternal Union.

Once more, We have no Notion of an eternal and necessary Existence, but in an absolutely perfect and infinite Nature; but if there be Three Parts in the Deity, Three Spiritual Beings of distinct and different Natures, neither of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite, (though we could suppose their Union to make such a perfect Being) because they are not the same, and neither of them is the whole; and therefore they cannot necessarily Exist, and yet a Deity, which consists of Parts, cannot necessarily

Exist, unless its Parts necessarily Exist; for a Compounded Being can Exist no otherwise than its Parts Exist.

But there is something in this, which seems to have a very ill Aspect upon the Trinity it self, as well as on the Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature. He *Profes-*
Pag. 37. *ses, indeed, not to Judge, that we are under the precise Notions of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, to conceive of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; though he has been for several Pages together, indicating such a representation of the Trinity, and teaching us thus to conceive of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, and thinks That *this gives ease to our Minds, by their being disentangled from any apprehended necessity of thinking these* (Power, Wisdom, and Goodness) *to be the very same things*; and if they be not the same thing, but Three really distinct Spiritual Beings, we must thus conceive of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and then the difficulty is in a *Compounded Deity*, by what name to call the Three Parts of the Composition, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, whether, as we are taught in the *Athanasian Creed*, we must own each of them *by himself, to be God and Lord*? For if all Three, by this Composition are but One God, neither of them by himself is true and perfect God; no more than a Part can be the Whole: This might be thought a very invidious consequence, had not he himself expressly owned it. *The Father, Son, and Spirit, being supposed*
Pag. 47. *necessarily existent in this united State, they cannot but be God, and the Godhead by reason of this necessary Union cannot but be One.* Yet so, *As that when you predicate Godhead, or the name of God, of any one of them, you herein express a true, but inadæquate conception of God*, i. e. *The Father is God, not excluding the Son and*

and Holy Ghoſt; the Son is God, not excluding the Father and the Holy Ghoſt; the Holy Ghoſt is God, not excluding the Father and the Son. As our Body is the Man, not excluding the Soul; our Soul is the Man, not excluding the Body.

This Compariſon of the Soul and Body, which are the Parts of a Man, and which in Union makes a compleat and perfect Man, explains what he means by the *inadequate Conception of God*, when we apply the Name God diſtinctly to Father Son and Holy Ghoſt, and in what Sence he ſays, *the Father is God, but not ſo as to exclude the Son*, &c. All Orthodox Chriſtians own, That the Father is God, not excluding the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt; and that the Son is God, not excluding the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt, *&c.* but then by this they mean, That the Father is true and perfect God, has the whole entire Divinity in himſelf, but yet the ſame whole entire Divinity diſtinctly and inſeparably ſubſiſts in the Perſon of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, that the ſame whole undivided Divine Nature ſubſiſts entirely in Three diſtinct Perſons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and therefore each of them by himſelf in the moſt proper and adæquate Conception is true and perfect God, tho' all Three are but one and the ſame God. But the Inquirers Notion of God, as applied to each Perſon, is a very *inadequate* Notion, for it ſignifies only a part of the Deity, That the Father is God, becauſe he is a part of the Godhead, and the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, God, as parts alſo of the ſame One Godhead; as the Soul is the Man, becauſe part of the Man; and the Body alſo the Man, as part of the Man; and therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are each of them God, but ſo as not to exclude

exclude each other, as no One essential Part can exclude the rest.

This is such a Notion of the Unity of the Godhead, as neither the Scriptures, nor the ancient Church knew any thing of; and I think there is little need to confute it. In short, as it makes a compounded Deity, so it makes but One compounded Person; for if the Godhead be but One by Composition, as the Man is by the Union of Soul and Body, if God be a Person he can be but One: For if you call the Three Parts of the Godhead Three Persons, yet neither of them is God, but in a very improper and figurative Sence, as a Part is called by the Name of the whole; so that either there is no Person in the Godhead, who is true and perfect God, or there must be but One compounded Person, as there is One compounded Godhead, and there is an end of the Christian Trinity. Some late Socinian Writers have been willing to compound this Dispute of a Trinity of Divine Persons, for the Three Attributes of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness; and if you have a mind to call these *Three Spiritual Beings*, I believe, they will not contend much about it; for they are not so much afraid of Three Parts of a Deity, as of Three Divine Persons, each of which is true and perfect God.

This also necessarily destroys the *Homoousion*, or Sameness of Nature, which the ancient Church asserted in the Persons of the Holy Trinity; for *Three Spiritual Beings*, which are the Parts of this *compounded Deity*, cannot be the same, no more than Soul and Body are; for the Parts of a compound, how closely soever they are united, cannot be the same;

for

for Three Sames, are not [illegible] Three Wholes. As to what his [illegible] If Power, Wisdom, and [illegible] and Holy Ghost, it is certain [illegible] Power is not the same with [illegible] nesse; nor Wisdom the same with [illegible] nesse; and therefore the Son [illegible] with his Father.

Which is another thing to be considered in the Enquirer's Notion, that it destroys the [illegible] of the Ever-blessed Trinity; for [illegible] and Holy Ghost, be Three Parts [illegible] ty, though we should grant their Union might make One God, yet these Parts could neither beget, nor be begotten, nor proceed from each other, and therefore could not be related to each other, as Father, and Son, and Spirit, but only as Three parts of the same *Compositum*. If Power be the Father, and Wisdom the Son, how comes Wisdom to be the Son of Power, and not to be Power [illegible] the Father is, since a Father begets his own Likeness? This destroys the natural Order and Subordination of the Persons in the Trinity; if Power, Wisdom and Goodness be Three real distinct things, and Three Spiritual Beings, which compleatly constitute the Godhead, let any Man tell me, which of these Three in order of Nature is the first, second, or third; why one is the Father, the other the Son, and the third the Holy Ghost. This makes me wonder to hear him talk of *Promanations*; for an Emanative Cause never produces any thing but of its own Nature, as Light naturally flows from the Sun.

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